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ILLEGAL LOFTS IN NEW YORK CITY: HAVE
THE EQUITIES BEEN BALANCED?
Jay Facciolo*
I.

Introduction

In New York City today, tens of thousands of people,' primarily
tenants, are illegally2 occupying lofts. 3 These tenants have signed
commercial leases, 4 often long-term leases at rents far below the
current market rate. The changing economics of loft buildings5 has
led to serious conflicts between landlords and tenants. Landlords
have sought to evict tenants before their leases expire, 6 refused to
renew their leases7 or demanded higher rental rates upon renewal.'
Tenants have withheld rent for extended periods. 9 These conflicts
have been taken to the courts, 0 and legislation recently enacted in
New York State attempts to resolve these issues for at least some
tenants and landlords." At the same time, New York City has been
concerned about this tenant-landlord conflict, as well as the overall
impact on the city's economy of both legal and illegal conversions
of loft buildings from manufacturing or commercial to residential
use.' 2 The city has taken an active role in seeking statutory solutions
to these problems, but it is yet unclear whether the city's efforts
3
have been successful.
A.

The Loft Building

A "loft" building is a multi-story nonresidential building, usually
with more than one tenant.' 4 In Manhattan, loft buildings were built
* Columbia University School of Law, J.D., 1983; Associated with the law firm
of Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel, New York, N.Y.
1. See infra note 65.
2. See infra notes 61, 62 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 58, 59 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., infra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., infra note 290.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., infra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 149-329 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 366-420 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 427 and accompanying text.
14. L. Kahn, The Loft Building in the Central Business District of Manhattan
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in three waves: 1870 through 1900, 1900 through World War I, and
1920 through 1931.'1 In 1934, a real property inventory showed that

39.3% of all rentable loft building floor space existing at that time
had been constructed prior to 1895.16 By 1957, the percentage of
pre-1895 loft buildings had dwindled to 2.9% 7 due to demolition

of older loft buildings."8 These pre-1895 lofts were built south of
14th Street, concentrating in areas near Broadway, Canal Street,
and the Hudson and East Rivers.' 9 After 1900, industry, led by the

apparel manufacturers, began to spread north of 14th Street.20 In
Manhattan, 32.8% of the loft space in 1934 had been constructed
between 1895 and 1914.2 ' Loft construction then slowed down until

the 1920's, at which time a final burst of loft construction occurred,
almost all of which was north of 14th Street.2
The changes in the structural characteristics of loft buildings coincided approximately with the three waves of their construction.
The typical pre-1895 loft building is "five stories high, situated on
a lot 25' x 100,' with the building covering 90 percent of the land." 23
1-6 (June 1963) (Pratt Institute planning thesis) [hereinafter cited as Kahn]. A loft
building has few or no interior bearing walls. "As such, it is basically a hollow
structural shell with reinforced floors and a maximum of rentable floor space. It
is not unusual, particularly on the upper floors, to have an entire floor with no
partitions at all, except possibly for a small office." Id. at 51. The term "loft"
is commonly used to refer both to the individual floors in such a building and to
the entire building itself. Where a distinction is necessary, this article will use "loft
living unit" to refer to a single floor or part of a floor converted to a residence
and "loft building" to refer to an entire building.
15. Id.at 12-27.
16. Id. at 34.
17. Id. at 32.
18. Id. at 33.
19. Id. at 16, 28-30.
20. Id. at 22-25. Other industries have moved at other times. The textile wholesalers established themselves in the late 1800's in the Worth Street area. I. Wagner,
A Policy Approach for Loft Living in Lower Manhattan 40-42 (October 1975) (the
Graduate School of Architecture and Planning, Columbia University, M.S. thesis)
[hereinafter cited as Wagner]. In the 1950's, the vast majority of these firms
relocated to mid-Manhattan. Id. at 47.
21. Kahn, supra note 14, at 34. This had increased to 40.8% by 1957. Id. at
32. Clearly, the pre-1895 buildings suffered the most demolition. Id. at 33.
22. Id. at 35. As of 1934, 20.6% of floor area had been constructed during
the 1920's. Id. at 34. This grew to 40% by 1957. Id. at 32.
23. C. RAPKIN, SOUTH HOUSTON INDUSTRIAL AREA 144 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as RAPKIN]. These older loft buildings
are of ordinary wood-joist construction, with the floors of rough wood
or cement ... [and] are carried by brick-bearing walls. Where the span
between the walls is too big, the floors are supported in the center by
cast-iron columns, wedged between floor and ceiling, and not actually
an integral part of the structure.
Kahn, supra note 14, at 51; see also RAPKIN, supra, at 145-47.
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During the second phase, which occurred after 1895, the supporting
cast-iron columns used in larger loft buildings were made more
uniform in thickness and thereby became safer.2 Finally, the third
phase, which occurred prior to World War I, saw the appearance
of a more modern form of loft, built on a steel frame with an
25
enclosed stairway and concrete floors.
B.

History of Loft Conversions 26

In the late 1950's and early 1960's, artists began to move into
28
smaller loft buildings 2 that manufacturers were beginning to vacate.

24. RAPKIN, supra note 23, at 145. Before 1895, the foundry process produced
hollow columns of uneven thickness which often resulted in insufficient thickness
at some points on the columns. Id. This lack of uniformity can be particularly
dangerous in fires. Id.
25. Kahn, supra note 14, at 51; RAPKIN, supra note 23, at 145.
26. A conversion occurs when a loft building or loft floor once used for
commercial and/or industrial purposes is remodeled or "converted" to accommodate
a resident. The usual lack of any interior walls in a loft, see Kahn supra note 14,
makes for easy conversions and unusual space arrangements. Id. at 52. At the
minimum, a conversion involves installing a full bathroom and a kitchen; at a
maximum, a loft floor may be converted into luxury housing. See S. ZUKIN, LOFT
LrVING: CULTURE AND CAPITAL IN URBAN CHANGE 61-62 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as

ZUKIN].

27. D. Diether, SoHo and NoHo Background 1 (Nov. 1975) (memorandum
from the Zoning Chairman, Manhattan Borough President's Community Board
No. 2) [hereinafter cited as Diether]. Artists began to move from Greenwich Village
as they started doing artwork on a larger scale and as rents began to rise. Id.
Artists first moved into SoHo (the area on the west central side of Manhattan
and south of Houston Street) and into NoHo (the area in the center of Manhattan
and north of Houston Street). Id.; Kahn, supra note 14, at 72 (noting that artists
had moved into loft buildings around the Bowery, from Houston to 8th Street).
As rents in SoHo increased, artists began to move into loft buildings in Tribeca
(the triangle below Canal Street on the west side of Manhattan). Wagner, supra
note 20, at 11.
28. Diether, supra note 27, at 1. As industries became more mechanized, the
small floors of many loft buildings did not give manufacturers a large enough
contiguous area to carry out efficient manufacturing. Id.; see also K. FORD, HOUSING
POLICY AND THE URBAN MIDDLE CLASS

3 (1978) (estimating that any building with

an area per floor of under 7,500 square feet is unlikely to attract a new business)
[hereinafter cited as FORD]; RAPKIN, supra note 23, at 64-79; J. Baifinson, Regulating
Loft Conversion in New York City: Better Late than Never 12 (Spring 1981)
(Princeton University senior thesis) [hereinafter cited as Bailinson]. By 1977, larger

buildings were also being converted. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, CITY OF NEW
YORK, RESIDENTIAL RE-USE OF NON-RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS IN MANHATTAN 33-34
(1978) [hereinafter cited as RESIDENTIAL RE-UsE].
Rapkin's discussion of the problems of operating in multi-story buildings is
particularly illuminating. See RAPKIN, supra note 23, at 64-79. Vertical buildings
were constructed initially because powered elevators were in use before horizontal
conveyors or powered industrial trucks. Id. at 68. Horizontal movement had to
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Not only were these manufacturers beginning to move out of smaller
29
loft buildings, they were also beginning to move out of Manhattan,
30
primarily in search of larger, single-floor facilities.
Shortly thereafter, non-artists also 3' began moving into loft buildings. They were in search of lower rents for larger spaces3 2 in a
be done by the comparatively slow means of hand trucks and hand carrying. Id.
In addition, the machines used in light manufacturing needed a central source of
power until electric motors were reduced in size. Id. at 69. Multi-story operations
today create problems with the layout of individual departments, id. at 69-71, and
with managing and supervising operations. Id. at 78.
29. Bailinson, supra note 28, at 11, 41.
30. Id. at 40-41. The areas of Manhattan with the smallest buildings also have
the greatest number of conversions. RESIDENTIAL RE-USE, supra note 28, at 7; REAL
ESTATE BOARD OF NEW

YORK,

INC., RESIDENTIAL USE OF MANHATTAN

INGS: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

LoFT

BUILD-

14 (1975) [hereinafter cited as RESIDENTIAL

USE]; Wagner, supra note 20, at 13.
31. In 1977, one study found that slightly more than one half of illegal loft
tenants were not artists. FORD, supra note 28, at 25. Other estimates indicate that
in the late 1970's twenty-five to thirty percent of loft residents in SoHo were not
artists. VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS, SPECIAL SPACE: A GUIDE TO ARTISTS'
HOUSING AND LOFT LIVING 92 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL SPACE). It is
estimated that twenty-five to fifty percent of the loft occupants in SoHo are not
artists. Bailinson, supra note 28, at 40.

The pace of the movement in the mid-1970's was measured in two areas of
Manhattan-Tribeca and Midtown South (Manhattan between 14th and 34th Streets
and 5th and 8th Avenues). RESIDENTIAL USE, supra note 30, at 14 (Midtown South);
Wagner, supra note 20, at 12 (Tribeca). Surveys of both areas used reverse telephone

directories, in which listings are by addresses rather than surnames, to find telephones
listed to loft building addresses. Id. Telephone numbers that were obviously used

for business were excluded, but the surveys' estimates are probably conservative
since not all loft residents would have a listed phone. RESIDENTIAL USE, supra note
30, at 14 (Midtown South); Wagner, supra note 20, at 12 (Tribeca). The Tribeca
study found that in August 1972 there were, in the sample area, 46 loft buildings
(27% of the total number of buildings) that had 198 tenants, 99 of whom were
residents. Id. at 13. By June 1975, 65 loft buildings had residents, and 173 out
of 231 telephones (75%) were registered to residents. Id. The Midtown South area
showed a similar increase. RESIDENTIAL USE, supra note 30, at 14. In August 1972,

115 buildings had residents and there were 267 residential telephone listings, which
accounted for 320o0 of all area listings. Id. By June 1975, 151 buildings (19% of
all loft buildings) had residents, and 495 out of 996 listings (4907o) were for residents.
Id.

32. In 1977 a typical newly converted apartment had 610 square feet and rented
for $393 per month. FORD, supra note 28, at 6. A typical illegal loft had 2,343
square feet and rented for $390 per month. Id. at 7; see ZUKIN, supra note 26,
at 142 ("living lofts were still a bargain by middle-class standards until 1971").
The illegal loft tenant had to invest an average of $5,248 in improvements to make
the loft livable, which was not necessary for residents of converted apartments.
FORD, supra note 28, at 6, 7. But over a five-year lease, such improvements would
cost only $104 a month. The typical illegal loft dweller, who might well have had
a five-year lease, see infra note 156 and accompanying text, thus paid 260o more
in rent for 384% more space.
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tight housing market" and sought the glamour of living in the same
style as artists and of sharing their neighborhoods.3 4 Although not
all of these new loft tenants were illegal, the overwhelming majority

were illegal, and many continue to be so under present laws."
The history of conversions of loft buildings is, in New York City,
predominantly a history of conversions in Manhattan. The vast
36
majority of New York City's loft buildings are in Manhattan,
despite the fact that only a little over fifty percent of the city's

total industrial space is in Manhattan." This Article discusses loft
conversions because they have been the predominant type of illegal
conversion to date;3" however, other types of industrial and com-

mercial buildings have also been illegally converted.
There has been much discussion of the impact the conversion of
lofts from commercial and industrial to residential uses has had on
Manhattan's commercial and industrial tenants. This issue is an
important one for New York City.3 9
The conventional view is that loft building owners welcomed the

artist pioneers and later non-artists because they occupied space not
otherwise rentable.40 The proponents of this view maintain that, even
33. See CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, CITY OF NEW YoRK, LOFTS: BALANCING
THE EQUITIES 41 (1981) (in Manhattan south of 59th Street, where most lofts are
located, there is only a 1% residential vacancy rate) ihereinafter cited as BALANCING
THE EQUITIES]; N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1982, at BI, col. 6 (city-wide vacancy rate
in apartments fell 30% from 1978 to 1981; vacancy rate in Manhattan was 1.907o
in 1981).

34. See

ZUKIN,

supra note 26, at 58-125.

35. See infra notes 297, 386 and accompanying text.
36. RESIDENTAL USE, supra note 30, at 33 (Table E shows that 4,222 of the
4,662 loft parcels in New York City in 1975 were in Manhattan).
37. RESIDENTIAL RE-USE, supra note 28, at 31.
38. See supra notes 27-28, 30 and accompanying text.
39. In 1958, 533,100 people were employed in loft buildings in Manhattan below
59th Street; this constituted 26.1% of the total labor force employed in Manhattan
south of 59th Street. Kahn, supra note 14, at 60. Although no comparable figures
are available for the 1970's or 1980's, in 1978, manufacturing firms in Manhattan
employed 297,000 people, or 53o of all manufacturing employees in New York
City, wholesaling firms employed 173,000 people and warehousing and trucking
firms employed 11,000. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, CITY OF NEW YORK,
PRELIMINARY REPORT: MANHATTAN LOFT CONVERSION PROPOSAL 11 (September 1980)
[hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY REPORT]. In comparison, in Manhattan below
59th Street in 1958, 527,500 were employed in manufacturing and 233,900 in
wholesaling. Kahn, supra note 14, at 64. Each of these industries continues to
depend upon loft buildings for space. See BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note
33, at 40-41. The year 1982 was the first year in which more people in New York
City were employed in finance than in manufacturing. N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1983,
at BI, col. 1 (488,000 compared with 463,000).
40. RESIDENTIAL USE, supra note 30, at 1; see Bailinson, supra note 28, at 13
(decline in manufacturing caused by factors other than conversion itself); MAYOR'S
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with the early influx of artists, during the first half of the 1970's
there was a thirty-five percent vacancy rate in loft buildings. Furthermore, the annual rental for lofts was typically one to two dollars
per square foot; this approximated the rents charged in the 1950's.4

Vacancies were purportedly so high that competition between com42
mercial and residential tenants for loft space was impossible.
Although an understanding of the political economy of loft conversions could be important in formulating judicial or legislative
approaches,43 the conventional wisdom on the subject has not been
properly evaluated. The demand for residential tenants has been
credited to the vacancy rates of the 1960's and early 1970's, and
the vacancies themselves have been explained by the movement of
industry out of Manhattan. This movement, however, might have

been created first in order to establish vacancies," rather than the
vacancies preceding the movement. The lack of any real debate over
the issues has greatly contributed to the absence of any clear explanation of the processes underlying widespread loft conversions.
Therefore, the conventional view has triumphed with little dissent.4 5
2-3 (1978)
(ample space is available in New York City for rent by industry) [hereinafter cited
as ACTION PLAN]. In adddition, many loft buildings were demolished. The number
of lofts in Manhattan dropped from over 9,200 in the late 1950's to fewer than
5,400 in the late 1970's; the newly vacant space was often used for office skyscrapers.
Bailinson, supra note 28, at 34. But by the early 1970's, the office market in
Manhattan was saturated. Id.
41. Bailinson, supra note 28, at 34.
42. RESIDENTIAL USE, supra note 30, at 18.
43. The New York courts have, until recently, tended to favor the tenants in
cases involving landlords and tenants of illegal loft buildings. See infra notes 146315 and accompanying text. The result has been that "these decisions protect
residential loft tenants at the expense of the landlord-and imply the eviction of
any remaining manufacturing tenants. The courts have pushed loft building owners
who are inclined to rent lofts for living rather than manufacturing to go all the
way to a 'legal' residential conversion." ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 170. If one
assumes that manufacturing is dying a natural death in Manhattan, there is nothing
problematic about this result. On the other hand, a resurgence of small manufacturing in Manhattan may well require a more neutral stance in battles between
landlords and illegal tenants. In these battles, no one currently represents the small
manufacturers.
The executive and legislative branches at both the city and state level have
explicitly claimed to be taking the manufacturers' interests into account when
proposing and passing the laws upon which New York City's seven-point program,
TASK FORCE ON LOFT CONVERSION, CITY OF NEW YORK, ACTION PLAN

see infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text, is based. See BALANCING THE EQUITIES,
supra note 33, at 1-2. Since the causes behind the movement of manufacturers out
of Manhattan are so poorly documented, one can only speculate as to the legislative
solutions that might have been tried at both the state and local levels.

44. See ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 13-14.
45. The small businesses that have been displaced have not had the political
strength nor the will to press their interests forcefully, id. at 25-26, while loft
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This triumph has not been so complete that alternative theories
have not developed. A second view maintains that residential conversion had a substantial impact on commercial tenants, driving
many of them out of lofts and ultimately, out of business." Sharon
Zukin, 47 the most deliberative of those holding this second view,
attempts to place the development of the market for residential lofts
in the context of larger developments in the American political
economy. Her thesis is that those she calls the "patrician elite"
have sought since World War II to "deindustrialize" Manhattan,
i.e., to make Manhattan an area of exclusively "high-rent housing
and even higher-rent offices. ' 48 Zukin points to a number of crucial
events in the process of deindustrialization. The first, the 1961
rezoning, rezoned much of the center of Manhattan from manufacturing to commercial districts, thereby allowing conversions to
residential use as of right4 9 and making any new lease to an industrial
tenant in a newly zoned commercial district technically illegal ° The
second, the 1965 plan presented by the Downtown-Lower Manhattan
Association under David Rockefeller's chairmanship, envisioned
transforming Manhattan south of Houston Street." Zukin asserts
that by 1965, ownership of loft buildings began to shift to new
tenant groups, of course, must favor residential conversion, even if they think it
should be reserved for favored groups such as artists. Id. at 124.
46. ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 33-34. Zukin surveyed a random sample of loft
buildings in the areas in which some conversion had occurred. Id. at 34. Lists of
businesses that had moved from the buildings were compiled and indicated that,
while 22%0 of all moves in 1963-68 occurred because of residential conversion carried
out by landlords, in 1973-78 this factor accounted for 33% of the moves. Further,
the percentage of moves initiated by landlords during these periods, motivated by
the desire for residential conversion increased from 45% to 81%. Id. at 33-35.
But cf. Wagner, supra note 20, at 31-32 (in Worth Street area most firms had
already left by time of survey, but random sampling showed only one of twelve
commercial loft occupants interviewed felt threatened by artists moving into area).
47. Ms. Zukin is an associate professor of sociology at Brooklyn College, and
author of Loft Living. See ZUKIN, supra note 26.
48. Id. at 25.
49. See infra note 66.
50. ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 41-42.
51. This plan included constructing a giant office complex (which became the
World Trade Center), several housing projects extending into the East and Hudson
Rivers, an expressway across Manhattan at Broome Street, and middle-income
housing and a sports arena replacing what is now SoHo. Id. at 44-45. This plan
incorporated a number of proposed projects dating back to 1940. Id. at 45. As
a result of packaging these proposals together, new mortgages, mortgage assignments
and tenant turnovers increased dramatically, although vacancies did not necessarily
increase in the same proportion. Id. at 46-47. Rapkin confirms that the proposed
construction of the Lower Manhattan Expressway across Broome Street "[flor many
years . . . made it difficult to rent space in that section of the area as it became
vacant." RAPKIN, supra note 23, at 248-49.
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owners." Initially, they were small investors, including owner-occupants, who were taking advantage of the comparatively low prices
at which loft buildings could be purchased." After 1975, these new
owners increasingly consisted of professional developers.5 4 Replacing
small business with middle- and upper-middle-class residents who

work in the elite's businesses," these new owners fulfilled the patrician
elite's vision.
52. ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 48. Rapkin found that two-thirds of the 1962
owners of loft buildings in SoHo had owned the buildings for a decade or longer;
and 400o7 of the owners were found in the buildings themselves, as they used part
or all for their own business. RAPKIN, supra note 23, at 226.
53. ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 129. Zukin, relying on RAPKIN, supra note 23,
at 237-39, points out that institutional lenders, the most important of which were
the savings banks and savings and loan associations, dramatically decreased the
amount they lent for first mortgages on SoHo loft buildings. ZUKIN, supra note
26, at 39. This disinvestment in loft buildings was parallelled by disinvestment in
the railroads on which the companies that occupied lofts depended to move their
goods. Id. at 39-40.
Zukin does not develop this crucial point in any detail. She fails, for example,
to link this lack of new mortgage money to the patrician plans she discusses. After
all, there were valid independent economic reasons, which Zukin details, for institutions to refuse to lend to loft building owners. Id. at 40. What Zukin's approach
does' suggest is a question Rapkin raised about the effect of the lack of new
mortgage money:
The contraction in the availability of mortgage money is undoubtedly a
consequence of the inability of the area to keep pace with general trends
in real estate prices, which have risen 25 percent since 1950, substantially
less than the increase experienced in other sections of Manhattan Island.
It is possible, however, that this tightening of mortgage funds has retarded
price rises which might have taken place were mortgage money freely
available.
RAPKIN, supra note 23, at 243-44.
The dearth of new mortgage money, when combined with the effects of the
1965 plan, see supra note 51 and accompanying text, led to a "devalorization"
of loft buildings in lower Manhattan. See ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 48. This
devalorization allowed small investors to invest in loft buildings. See id. at 45-46.
Zukin's hypothesis is that the very first small investors, the artists, became the
means by which the patrician elite, after the defeat of its 1965 plan, moved to
carry out its primary goal: the deindustrialization of Manhattan. Id. at 111-12. By
romanticizing loft living, the artist pioneers helped pave the way for the large-scale
conversions that drove small business from Manhattan. Id. at 111-25, 173-92. See
generally N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1983, § 8, at 1, col. 1 (developer of luxury
condominium loft building in SoHo explained that "[tihis building is not so much
for artists . . . as for people who want the life style of an artist").
54. ZuiIN, supra note 26, 130-33.
55. See id. at 175-76. Zukin relied heavily on Chester Rapkin's classic study
of the future SoHo, which was entitled South Houston Industrial Area, to show
the stability of SoHo before 1965. Id. at 36-37. Rapkin found that only 5.7% of
the total gross floor area in loft buildings was vacant, RAPKIN, supra 'note 23, at
248, and concluded that demand for loft space by manufacturers was high. Id. at
256. He found that the low rent was the most important reason that firms located
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While agreeing with the conventional view that a high vacancy

rate was responsible for the initial wave of conversions, 6 the New
York City Planning Commission has now adopted a position that
seeks to meet "the twin goals of industrial preservation and housing

opportunity." ' 7 With a decline in the vacancy rate in loft buildings
in Manhattan to approximately two percent, a rate similar to vacancy
rates in the industrial areas of other New York City boroughs,
together with a stabilization of the manufacturing industry, competition for space among residential, commercial and industrial
users became keen.58 New York City has sought both to protect
industry and to guarantee some illegal residential loft tenants the
protection of the law.59 The current trend, which was commented
on as early as 1981, is to convert loft buildings to offices, rather
than residences. 6°
C.

Illegal and Legal Lofts

A residential loft is illegal when its use does not conform
with those allowed in its district under the New York City
Zoning Resolution 6 ' and no attempt to obtain a variance has been
in SoHo. Id. at 117. Further, these low rents resulted from market forces, not
rent control. Id. at 258. Not only were rents low, but assessed valuation, which
closely approximated market value in SoHo at the time, had risen more slowly
since World War II in SoHo than in other parts of Manhattan. Id. at 19. Combined,
these factors provided an "incubator" for small, entreprenurial business. Id. Paradoxically, the low market values of SoHo buildings provided fodder for speculation
and housing development which destroyed the area's ability to operate as an
incubator for manufacturers. See ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 129. This vision of a
golden age for small manufacturers in Manhattan must be tempered by the realization
that New York City's process of deindustrialization began right after World War
II, not in the mid-1960's. Id. at 23-27; cf. Kahn, supra note 14, at 135 (vacancy
rates in loft buildings below Canal Street increased from 2.6% to 10.50o of gross
floor space between 1947 and 1961, while vacancies in the areas that became known
as SoHo and NoHo increased from 0.1% to 4.1%).
56. See BALANCING

THE EQUITIES,

supra note 33, at 42.

57. Id. at i (preface).
58. See id. at 40-41. The decline in the vacancy rate in Manhattan was approximately two percent. Id. There were similar vacancy rates in the industrial
areas of the other boroughs. Id.
59. See infra notes 85, 86 and accompanying text.
60. BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33, at 43; Oser, New Life on the Way
for Site at Fifth Ave. and 42nd St., N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1981, at B5, col. 1
(renovated office space rents for as much as $12 per square foot per year).
61. The body of the current New York Zoning Resolution was first adopted
by the Board of Estimate in 1961, see BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33,
at 25, pursuant to the authority granted by the state legislature. See N.Y. GEN.
CITY LAW § 20(24), (25) (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1986). The Zoning Resolution
creates zoning districts and prescribes the permitted uses of buildings within each.
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successful, 2 and/or when a building, the use of which has been
changed from industrial or commercial to residential, does not have
the proper multiple-dwelling certificate of occupancy.6 3 As of 1977,
BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33, at 2-5. The three basic uses are commercial,
residential, and manufacturing. Id. The goals of the Zoning Resolution are carried
out "by a set of controls [for each district] which define (1) permitted land uses,
(2) applicable bulk standards such as height, setback and permitted floor area, (3)
permitted residential density." Laber & Kretchmer, New Legislative Acts Set Flexible
Standards for Legal Conversions, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1977, at 25, col. 4, at 37,
col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Laber & Kretchmer].
62. See infra notes 66 & 79.
63. All buildings must have a certificate of occupancy, whether they are multiple
dwellings and residential buildings or commercial and industrial buildings. N.Y.
CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ C26-121.2 to -121.5 (Williams 1978 & Supp. 1985-86). No
change may be made in the "use of an existing building which is inconsistent with
the last issued certificate" unless a new certificate is issued. Id. § C26-121.5.
In deciding illegal loft cases, the courts have developed a doctrine that loft
buildings with three or more loft living units are de facto multiple dwellings. See
infra notes 163-240 and accompanying text. No multiple dwelling, which is defined
as the "residence or home of three or more families living independently of each
other," N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4.7 (McKinney 1974), can be occupied "in
whole or in part" until the New York City Department of Buildings issues a
certificate of occupancy for the building. Id. § 301.1; see also N.Y. CITY CHARTER
§§ 645(b)(3) (Williams Supp. 1985-86), 1804(4)(c) (Williams 1976 & Supp. 198586). To obtain a certificate of occupancy, a multiple dwelling must comply with
the Multiple Dwelling Law ("MDL"), the New York City Building Code and "all
other applicable law." See N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 301.1 (McKinney 1974).
The MDL applies to "all cities with a population of three hundred twenty-five
thousand or more," id. § 3.1 (McKinney Supp. 1986), and is intended to guarantee
minimum levels of health and safety in multi-family buildings. Some sections of
the MDL have been particularly difficult for former loft buildings to meet-for
example, sections 26 and 31 "establish light and air standards and require, among
other things, (1) a thirty foot rear yard for all interior lots, (2) a 10% ratio of
window area opening to total floor area for all living rooms, and (3) a maximum
permitted distance of thirty feet" from any wall to window in any living room
within a one bedroom or non-fireproof unit. Laber & Kretchmer, supra note 61,
at 37, col. 1.
The New York City Building Code is a large tome of some 500 pages. N.Y.
CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ C26-100.1 to -1912.1 (Williams 1978 & Supp. 1985-86). The

Building Code applies "to the construction, alteration, repair, demolition, removal,

maintenance, occupancy and use of new and existing buildings in the city of New
York . . . ." Id. § C26-100.3. Specific provisions of the Building Code govern the
issuance of certificates of occupancy. Id. §§ C26-121.1 to -121.12. The Building
Code is enforced by the Commissioner of Buildings, except for certain provisions
which are enforced by the Fire Commissioner. Id. § C26-100.6.
Variances concerning certain light, air, and safety sections of the MDL may
be granted by the Board of Standards and Appeals if it can be shown that compliance
"causes any practical difficulties or any unnecessary hardships" and that substantial

compliance is achieved by alternative means. N.Y.

MULT. DWELL. LAW.

§ 310.2

(McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1986). But this variance procedure can be expensive and
time consuming. Laber & Kretchmer, supra note 61, at 37, col. 1. The Board of

Standards and Appeals also can grant variances to the Building Code. N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE § C26-100.7 (Williams 1978).
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over ninety percent of loft conversions were illegal;" the total number
of conversions, both legal and illegal, constituted slightly under twentyfive percent of all loft buildings in Manhattan's industrial areas. 65

Most conversions have occurred in districts where residential use is
allowed "as of right," ' 66 so that violation of the Zoning Resolution
6
has not been the primary cause of illegality. 1

The lower costs associated with illegal conversions, and the problems New York City has had with enforcing the law, have accounted
for the popularity of illegal conversions, in which residential certificates of occupancy are not sought. Conversions, whether legal
or illegal, have a cost advantage over new housing: as of 1977,
construction costs were about one-third lower for conversions, 68 while
64. RESIDENTIAL RE-USE, supra note 28, at 8.
65. Id. This study covered buildings south of 59th Street which had three or
more residential units. Id. The number of converted buildings is therefore understated
because buildings with only one or two residences were omitted. The total number
of new dwelling units was approximately 10,000. Id. at 9. There has not yet been
an update of the Department of City Planning's study. See RESIDENTIAL RE-USE,
supra note 28. Exactly how many people currently live in illegal lofts is a matter
of considerable uncertainty, with estimates ranging upwards of 50,000. See ZUKIN,
supra note 26, at 6.
66. Residential "use" is permitted in six of the eight types of commercial
districts; manufacturing "use" is not permitted without a variance in any of the
eight types. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 32-10 (1981). In commercial districts, no
bulk zoning standards were applied to a building converting from a non-conforming
to a conforming use (i.e., from manufacturing to residential use) before the April
9, 1981 amendments to the Zoning Resolution. Id. § 52-31. Where a building in
a commercial district was changing from commercial use to residential use, i.e.,
from one conforming use to another conforming use, the new construction standards
in Article 1I, Residence District Requirements, applied. Id. § 34-10.
As of April 9, 1981, Article 1, Chapter 5, id. §§ 15-00 to -582 (1982), was
added to the Zoning Resolution to make easier the residential conversion of existing
non-residential buildings in certain community districts of Manhattan by allowing
new dwelling units to meet the special standards of Article 1, rather than of Article
11 (the generally applicable Residence District Regulations). Id. § 15-00(a) (1981).
Article I1 regulates, for example, "the density of population and the bulk of
buildings in relation to the land around them and to one another . . . [and] access
of light and air to windows." Id. § 21-00(d), (f).
In theory, these regulations could have presented serious difficulties for a
conversion before Article 1, Chapter 5, was added. A variance was required for
a conversion to meet the Zoning Resolution new construction requirements such
as a 30 foot rear yard. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 39, at 21. Variances,
however, have been easy to obtain, see infra note 79 and accompanying text, and
the practical effect before the April 1981 amendments was that "in reality the only
[housing] standards which appl[ied] to conversions [were] those in the Multiple
Dwelling Law, and the Building Code except in the [Lower Manhattan Mixed Use]
District." Id. at 22.
67. RESIDENTIAL RE-USE, supra note 28, at 9.
68. Id. at 41. The cost of newly constructed industrial loft space in the early
1960's would have been $12 to $15 per square foot, exclusive of land, while
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the market rents that could be charged did not differ between new
housing and conversions. 69 In addition, illegal conversions are easier
for the developer to finance than legal ones because the tenants
raise the capital to make their own spaces habitable. 0 The developer
also has the option of selling the spaces if he does not wish to rent
them.7' Illegal conversion also shelters the building from a higher
tax assessment.7 2 Since compliance with the Multiple Dwelling Law
("MDL") and the Building Code 3 can be expensive," once a developer

has decided to invest only a minimal amount of capital in a building,
he will not seek the Building Code compliance necessary to obtain

a residential certificate of occupancy.
The startling economic advantages to a landlord of illegal conversions over legal conversions were illustrated in a 1979 study which
examined rental, but not cooperative, loft living units. 7' The building
and improvement cost of an illegal residential rental loft building
was $7.00 per square foot and the return was over thirty-five percent
on a twenty-five percent equity investment for a partial conversion
and one hundred percent for a complete conversion. In contrast,
the cost for a legal residential rental loft building was $56.00 per

rehabilitated industrial loft space in SoHo would have had a median cost of $3.10
per square foot. RAPKIN, supra note 23, at 209, 231.
69. RESIDENTIAL RE-USE, supra note 28, at 41.
70. MAYOR'S TASK FORCE ON
PLAN 3 (1978) (hereinafter cited

LoFr

CONVERSIONS,

CITY OF NEW YORK, ACTION

as TASK FORCE]. Tenant financing is particularly
attractive when financing is difficult for the developer to obtain. RESIDENTIAL REUSE, supra note 28, at 44. Tenant financing also allows the developer to keep his
carrying costs down. Id. The use of tenant financing has greatly inflated the values
of potentially convertible properties because the developer needs relatively small
amounts of capital before he can rent or sell units. TASK FORCE, supra, at 4. A
loft building selling for $30,000 in 1960 could be selling for $250,000 in 1971.
SPECIAL SPACE, supra note 31, at 123 n.50.
71. The price for a typical residential loft cooperative increased 1,500% from
1970 to 1980. Bailinson, supra note 28, at 37. Typical loft rents rose 500%,
compared to a rise for one-bedroom or two-bedroom apartments during the same
period of 316%. See id.
72. H. Shostal, Special Zoning District for Lower Manhattan's Industrial Zones
2 (Oct. 23, 1975) (memorandum from the Mayor's Office of Lower Manhattan
Development, City of New York).
73. For a discussion of the MDL and the Building Code, see supra note 63.
74. See RESIDENTIAL RE-USE, supra note 28, at 46. Another reason why certificates
of occupancy are not obtained by developers is that the procedure for obtaining
a residential certificate of occupancy was not designed for the typical construction
pattern of an illegal loft building. Id. at 52.
75. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 39, at 18. The study did not consider the
return possible from selling converted cooperative loft living units. Id. at 83 n.10.
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square foot, and even with a J-51 tax abatement,76 returned slightly
over seventeen percent. 77

New York City's ineffective enforcement of the laws exacerbates
the problem of illegal loft conversion. The Buildings Department,

which is responsible for policing illegal lofts, is buried under a
blizzard of 40,000 backlogged violations involving all types of housing. 78 Further, in the few cases in which New York City has taken
an active role in opposing conversions that violated the Zoning
79
Resolution, the developers have been able to gain variances.
76. J-51 is a real estate tax incentive program administered by New York City
for eligible building owners who rehabilitate existing structures. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE
tit. J, § J-51-2.5 (Williams Supp. 1985-86). The tax benefit consists of a real
property exemption and a tax abatement. The tax exemption freezes the tax assessment of the property at the level existing before an owner makes an improvement.
Id. § J-51-2.5(b) (Williams Supp. 1985-86). The tax abatement permits an owner
to decrease the amount of tax imposed upon the property. Id. § J-51-2.5(c)
(Williams Supp. 1985-86). For an in-depth analysis of J-51 see Note, New York
City's J-51 Program: Controversy and Revision, 12 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 103 (198384).

77.

PRELIMINARY REPORT,

supra note 39, at 18. However, this was substantially

more than industrial rental space would have returned. Id.
78. Bailinson, supra note 28, at 44-45. Budget cuts have left the Buildings
Department with too few inspectors; the penalties that can be imposed are low,
especially in relation to potential profits. Id. at 45. Traditionally, Building Code
and zoning compliance has been voluntary; an eviction proceeding brought by the
city is the only remedy for use that does not conform to zoning requirements.
Laber & Kretchmer, supra note 61, at 37, col. 3.
79. Bailinson, supra note 28, at 45-47. Variance applications are first reviewed
by the community board of a zoning district if the variance involves land in only
one district, or by the community boards and borough board if the application involves
more than one district. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 668.a. I (Williams 1976 & Supp. 1985-86).
The procedures in section 668 are an amplification of those provided in the uniform
land use review procedure section of the New York City Charter Id. § 197-c.
Community boards, which review most applications for zoning variances for loft
conversions, are composed of the city council members for the area, who do not
vote on the board, and not more than 50 persons appointed by the borough
president. Id. § 2800.a. The community board makes a recommendation to the
Board of Standards and Appeals ("BSA"). The recommendation does not bind
the BSA, which makes the actual decision on the application. Id. § 668.a.4. See
generally N.Y. GEN. Crr LAW § 81 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (mandating creation
of BSA as forum for appeals on zoning enforcement and for such other zoning
matters as City Council provides).
The BSA is a six-member body appointed by the Mayor; two members must

be registered architects and two must be licensed engineers.

NEW YORK CITY CHARTER

§ 661.a, .b (Williams 1976). If the decisions of the BSA are appealed, they may
be reviewed by the City Board of Estimate, but the review is limited to "whether
the decision of the board of standards and appeals under each of the specific
requirements of the zoning resolution was supported by substantial evidence before
the board of standards and appeals." Id. § 668.c.
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Community boards and the BSA often reach contradictory decisions. Between
1969 and 1979, the community board in the community district which includes
SoHo, NoHo and Greenwich Village, approved thirty-nine applications and rejected
twenty-one. Some developers were discouraged at this stage, but those developers
who went to the BSA had complete success, getting fifty-one variances for fiftyone applications. ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 156-57.
The BSA is guided by a list of five findings, as set forth in the Zoning
Resolution, which it must make before granting a variance, e.g., that unique physical
conditions of the lot would cause "practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship"
in complying with the use provisions or bulk provisions of the Zoning Resolution.
N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 72-21(a)-(e) (1981). In light of these required findings,
one can easily imagine a BSA turning down variances in the 1970's and being less
sympathetic to the new investor and the speculator landlords. In reality, the BSA
has almost always granted the variances, often basing its findings on the ground
that a loft building which cannot meet the zoning requirements for a new building
is a "unique condition which would result in hardship [for the landlord] if compliance
with the zoning were required." PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 39, at 22.
By the end of 1979, of the 132 loft conversion applications submitted since
1971, 89 had been granted by the BSA, 3 had been withdrawn, and 40 were still
pending. Bailinson, supra note 28, at 46. The only obstacle to getting a variance
has been the cost. In 1977, fees for professional services ran as high as $10,000,
RESIDENTL RE-USE, supra note 28, at 47; this, of course, encouraged illegal
conversions in some situations.
The courts' great deference to the BSA has thwarted the few attempts other
city entities have made to enforce the Zoning Resolution. In City of New York
v. Singer Studio Corp., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1979, at 6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1979), New York City brought suit against a developer, alleging that
residential conversion would violate the Zoning Resolution and that the developer
had not obtained the legally required building permits and certificates of occupancy.
This was an unusual action for the City to bring, one that was brought only
because of the "outrageous illegality" of the project, Bailinson, supra note 28, at
45-46, and because of pressure on the City from the commercial and manufacturing
tenants who were being forced out. See Letter from Hi-Style Hat Co. to Sandy
Hornick (Mar. 9, 1978) (Hi-Style Hat was a tenant in Singer building and Mr. Sandy
Hornick is on the staff of the City Planning Commission).
The court did not grant an injunction because an appeal by the developer for
a variance was pending before the BSA, although the court did continue the
temporary restraining order. Singer Studio, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1979, at 6, col. 5.
The BSA approved the variance, even though "there was testimony from numerous
sources [that] the developers had violated several laws. Witnesses also testified that
viable businesses had been evicted to facilitate the conversion." Bailinson, supra
note 28, at 46. The City then appealed the case. Id. at 53 n.27.
In West Broadway Assoc. v. Board of Estimate, N.Y.L.J., June 7, 1979, at
11, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), the New York City Planning Commission and Community Planning Board No. I took an appeal to the Board
of Estimate of a variance granted by the BSA that would have allowed conversion
of an eleven story loft building. Id. at 11, col. 5. When the Board of Estimate
overturned the grant of the variance, the building owner brought an article 78
proceeding. Looking to the language of section 668 of the New York City Charter,
the court limited the Board of Estimate's review to the traditional limited nature
of a review of administrative agency action and found that the Board had exceeded
its jurisdiction. See id. at 12, col. 1; accord In re Hellmuth Building Co., N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 11, 1981, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (court construed
"unique physical condition" requirement of section 72-21 of Zoning Resolution,

1986]

ILLEGAL LOFTS

573

Not all loft conversions, of course, are illegal. A market has
developed for relatively conventional apartments created out of converted loft buildings.8 0 As the 1970's progressed, this market became
more active."' Accurate figures are unavailable on the number of
residents in these new apartment buildings but there may be more
residents in legal conversions than in illegal conversions.8 2 The development of a "loft lifestyle," growing out of the earlier illegal
conversions and the declining rate of new apartment construction,
helped to spark this more slowly developing legal market.83
Thus, conversions have created two kinds of problems: (1) the
generic problems common to both legal and illegal lofts, 4 and (2)
the problems unique to illegal lofts. This article focuses on the
and held that " '[ulniqueness' does not require that only the parcel in question
and none other, [sic] be affected by the specific condition which creates the
hardship." (citing Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Klein, 51 N.Y.2d 963, 416 N.E.2d
1040, 435 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1980)). The Board of Estimate argued that the condition must
not be so prevalent in the district so that if all parcels were granted variances "the zoning of the district would be materially changed." Id. In the alternative, the Board of
Estimate contended that even if the traditional standard were the standard of review, the
BSA's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. The court reviewed
the evidence for each of the five findings the BSA had made pursuant to section
72-21 of the Zoning Resolution. Id. Particularly revealing was the court's handling
of section 72-21(c), which requires a finding "[tihat the variance, if granted, will
not alter the essential character of the neighborhood or district." N.Y. CITY ZONING
RES. § 72-21(c) (1981). The court held that, since residential use was not prohibited
in the district, and since the only zoning prohibition of conversion was on the size
of the building in question, the essential character of the district would not be
changed. Hellmuth Bldg. Co., supra at 5, col. 3. The City Planning Commission
pointed out that of 99 buildings in the area that were prohibited by their size
from converting, only four had been converted to residential use. Bowden, City
Rules in Favor of Mixed Uses, Wash. Market Rev., June 1979, at 13, col. I
[hereinafter cited as Bowden]. But the court's reasoning, which focuses on the fact
that residential use was permitted in the district, would apply to any commercial
district. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. It may have been important
to the decision that even if the Board of Estimate's position had been upheld, the
building would have been a functioning, albeit illegal, residential building, as
residents were planning to move in whether or not there was a variance. Bowden,
supra, at 13, cols. 1, 4.
80. ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 6, 19.
81. RESIDENTIAL RE-USE, supra note 28, at 9. Only one legal conversion occurred
prior to 1965: from 1965 to 1972 there were one to four legal conversions a year;
in 1973 there were six legal conversions; each subsequent year the number doubled
until it reached 36 in 1976; and in the first eight months of 1977 there were
fourteen legal conversions. Id.
82. FORD, supra note 28, at 6-7, 100-05.
83. Id. at 78-81, 140-43.
84. The most important of these generic problems has been the competition
for loft space between commercial and industrial uses and residential uses. See
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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unique problems of illegal lofts, which have spawned almost all the
case law. The fact that many conversions have been legal, however,

cannot be forgotten, especially when discussing the legislative responses in the last several years to loft conversions.
D.

New York City's Program

In the late 1970's the executive branch of New York City created
a seven-point program to deal with existing illegal conversions and
to guide future legal conversions in Manhattan. The City explicitly
articulated two concerns: preventing residential conversion from hurting the city's economy by driving out manufacturing85 and guaranteeing the protection of the law to illegal residential tenants.8 6 The
City Planning Commission summarized the seven-point program as
follows:
1. Zoning map amendments which reflect land use changes since
the 1961 zoning ordinance.
2. Zoning text changes which establish standards for recycled
buildings.
3. Zoning text changes requiring, as a condition of conversion,
relocation assistance for displaced industrial firms which relocate
within New York City. These benefits will be funded by developers
who convert to residential use.
4. State legislation recognizing the residential status of illegal loft
dwellers and providing a framework for legalization.
5. Removal of the tax incentive programs of J-51 and 421 used
for residential conversion in Manhattan's loft districts reserved
for business uses.
6. A special mayoral office for loft enforcement to create the
proper deterrent to new illegal conversions and to monitor the
legalization of existing illegal conversions. This office combines
inspection and prosecutorial functions, and gives the City a strong
zoning and code enforcement capability which it heretofore lacked.
7. Amendments to Article 7-B of the Multiple87 Dwelling Law to
simplify the standards for recycled buildings.
All of these seven points have been implemented.
85. BA.ANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33, at 1.
86. One problem is the possibility of an injury or fatality in loft living units
or in loft buildings that do not meet the MDL and Building Code. Id. at 43.
Although this is a potentially serious problem, the City, in its most authoritative
study to date, did not focus on this issue. Id. It only discussed one example of
such occurrences. Id. The other problem is landlord and tenant conflicts which do
not fall within the statutes regulating residential units. This is the primary focus
of Section III of this Article.
87. Id. at 1-2. The overall goal of these plans is not to stop conversion but,
rather, to minimize the damage to manufacturing. See id. At least one commentator
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The Unresolved Problems of Loft Conversion

Although the seven-point program was conceived and presented
as a unified program, this Article will examine in detail only the
fourth point-the residential status legislation; the other aspects of
the City's program have been ably covered by other commentators. 8
In addition, this Article will discuss the case law that developed in
response to the problems of landlords and tenants, case law that
profoundly influenced the shaping of the residential status legislation.
New York City's program legalizes only some of the present illegal
residential lofts. Therefore, case law remains important to illegal
residential loft tenants. The premise of the City's program is that
new illegal conversions can be prevented through proper enforcement
efforts.8 9 It is not clear, however, whether the city has committed
doubts that the city can both keep manufacturing and allow substantial conversion.
Bailinson, supra note 28, at 25. He sees the choice as one "between the poor who
work in and depend on the loft industries and the people who would move in to
convert the lofts into residences-the 'new elite.' " Id. Bailinson thinks that the
City's housing officials and the real estate interests have made a decision in favor
of the "upper-income, white collar workers . . . [who are] essential to the growth
and vitality of the city's service economy," id. at 25, that is the sector of the
New York economy that has grown most vigorously since the 1950's. Id. at 1316; accord ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 52-57 (Zukin, of course, places the decision
further back in time than Bailinson, and sees it as having helped to create the
growth in the City's service economy, rather than being merely a reaction to such
growth).
88. See, e.g., Bailinson, supra note 28 (especially strong on zoning); BALANCING
THE EQUITIES,

supra note 33 (same); Lehner & Sweet, Conversions of Residential

Cooperatives, Lofts (pts. I & 2), N.Y.L.J., Dec. 24, 1980, at 1, col. 2, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 2 (especially strong on article 7-B of the Multiple Dwelling
Law); Lehner, Sweet & Allen, City Proposes Remedies for Illegal Conversions of
Lofts to Residences, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1978, at 23, col. 5 (same) [hereinafter
cited as Lehner, Sweet & Allen]; Laber & Kretchmer, supra note 61 (same). See
generally SPECIAL SPACE, supra note 31 (good general introduction to loft living).
89. "The key to effective enforcement is both delineation of realistic manufacturing zones [through zone map changes] reflecting industrial strength and the
allocation by the City of additional enforcement capability organized and deployed

in such a way as to secure the maximum impact."

BALANCING THE

EQurrIEs, supra

note 33, at 49.
The mayor established the Mayor's Office of Loft Enforcement on October 1,
1980, which is expected to stop illegal conversions. Bailinson, supra note 28, at
130. In addition, an Industrial Loft Advisory Council, as defined by the April 9,
1981 amendments to the Zoning Resolution, N.Y. CITY ZONING REs. § 12-10 (1981),
consisting of industry and union representatives, has been established. The City
Planning Commission thinks the Council will function as an "early warning system
regarding possible future disruptions in the City's economy." BALANCING THE
EQurriEs, supra note 33, at 5.
Bailinson notes that the effect of the program will be to make conversions
more expensive. See Bailinson, supra note 28, at 141; accord Oser, New Life on
the Way for Site at Fifth Ave. and 42nd St., N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1981, at B5,
cols. 1, 4 (developer who had been planning to convert loft building to residence
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the necessary financial resources to the effort. Moreover, the basic
economic forces that have made illegal conversions attractive have
not changed, 90 nor has it become any more politically viable to evict
illegal tenants. 9'
I.

The Statutory Law to June 1982

The statutory response to loft tenants has fallen into three main
categories: (1) changes in the New York City Zoning Resolution;
(2) bills to amend the MDL to facilitate conversions by easing, for
conversions only, the statutory health and safety requirements; and
92
(3) bills to provide residential status for tenants of illegal lofts.
before the April 9, 1981 Zoning Resolution amendments now plans office conversion
instead). This conclusion assumes that conversions will conform to the law.
The economic aspects of loft buildings are changing from what they were in
the early 1970's. What the effect will be on illegal conversion is unclear. The first
trend is a low rate of vacancy in loft buildings-less than 2%7o from 1979 to 1981.
BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33, at 40-41. The second trend helps explain
this rate: offices are beginning to compete with manufacturing for loft space.
Bailinson, supra note 28, at 143. The third trend also helps explain the low vacancy
rate: manufacturing demand for loft space has been reviving, especially in buildings
with 4,000 square feet or more per floor. REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK,
INC.,

PROSPECTS FOR LOFT BUILDINGS IN THE 1980's: A RESPONSE TO THE CITY

PLANNING DEPARTMENT'S

ADAPTIVE RE-USE PROPOSALS

3 (1981) [hereinafter cited

as REBNY RESPONSE]. Now that loft buildings have other profitable uses aside
from residential conversion, the overall rate of conversion may well decline. But
there is no reason that increased non-residential demand should lead to legal
conversion rather than illegal conversion.
One effect of the increased demand and prices in Manhattan has been to
encourage residential conversion outside of Manhattan. See BALANCING THE EQUITIES,
supra note 33, at 5, 56. Manhattan had 54.9%'o of the industrial space in New
York City as of the late 1960's, RESIDENTIAL RE-USE, supra note 28, at 31, so
that there were fewer opportunities for conversion outside Manhattan; nonetheless,
the opportunities are plentiful. The City Planning Commission has already begun
to study some of these areas. BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33, at 56.
90. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
91. In the early 1960's, when there were perhaps 3,000-5,000 artists living in
lofts, ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 6, the New York City Buildings Department evicted
some 100 artists. Id. at 49-50. The City did not have the political will to carry
through this eviction program; rather, the City created the Artists-in-Residence
program. See id. For a description of the program, see infra note 117.
92. In this regard, two important executive agency actions were the designation
of SoHo as a historic district by the New York City Landmarks Preservation
Commission in 1973 thereby preventing demolition or significant change of approximately 500 buildings, SPECIAL SPACE, supra note 31, at 31, and the creation
of a special school district for much of SoHo by the New York City Board of
Education in 1975. ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 154. This special school district allows
SoHo parents to choose the elementary school to which they will send their children.
Id. This choice, in practice, allows parents to pick the West Village over the
"typically inner city schools" which their children would otherwise attend. Id.
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Although proponents of these measures have seen these statutory
responses as part of a unified plan to deal with illegal loft residences, 93
the primary focus of this Article will be on the residential status
bills. This is the area in which substantial debate about the basic
substance and purpose of the statute continues; the other two types
of statutory response are already represented by substantial histories
of legislation and revision. 94
A.

Zoning

In 1971, the Zoning Resolution95 was first amended to take account
of the special needs of artists. This change took place three years
after a group representing SoHo artists" made the initial request.
The changes allowed artists certified by the New York City Department of Cultural Affairs to occupy joint living-working spaces
in buildings in the SoHo manufacturing zone. 9 7 Such joint livingworking activity was defined by the amendment as a "special manufacturing use." 98 There were maximum size requirements for the
buildings" and a minimum size requirement of 1200 square feet for
each joint living-work unit where there was more than one such
unit per floor.'" Joint living-working quarters could be integrated
vertically with industrial uses,' 0' but, depending on the size of the
building, commercial and joint living-working quarter uses were
restricted on the first two floors of a building.' 0 2 In 1976, the territory
covered by these amendments was extended to include NoHo 1°3 and
the maximum size of eligible buildings was expanded to 5000 square
feet, °4 except along Broadway, where it was 3600 square feet.'0
In 1977, the Lower Manhattan Mixed Use District was created,
encompassing the areas that became known as Tribeca. The mixed
93. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 95-148 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 61.
96. BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33, at 26.

97. N.Y.

CITY ZONING RES.

§§ 42-01, -14D.1 (1981).

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. § 42-14D.1 (1981).
SPECIAL SPACE, supra note 31, at 35.
N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 43-17.
Id. § 42-01 (1981).
Id. §§ 42-14D.I(d), -14D.2 (1981).

103.

SPECIAL SPACE,

supra note 31, at 34-35.

104. Id.at 35.
105. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 42-14D.l(b). Zoning district MI-5A is the area
of SoHo west of Mercer Street and north of Broome Street; Zoning district MI5B includes the rest of SoHo, and NoHo. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. ZONING MAPS
12a & 12c.
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use district amendment evolved from the concepts of the SoHo and
NoHo amendments. It created a mixed-use zoning district where not
only artists, but tenants in general could live,1° 6 and standards for
as of right residential conversions. 0 7 Most notable among the standards for as of right residential conversion were the maximum size
restriction of 5000 square feet on the size of convertible buildings,' 8
and the strict housing quality controls-stricter than those in article
7-B. 109

The most recent amendments to the Zoning Resolution were approved by the Board of Estimate on April 9, 1981.'"0 Density standards for conversions, formerly as stringent as those for new residential
buildings, were replaced with new standards tailored to conversions;"'
the light and air provisions of article 7-B were made applicable to
conversions;"12 the boundaries of manufacturing zones were reduced; ' 3 a new type of zoning district, the mixed-use district, was
created; 1 4 SoHo and NoHo remained legally open only to artist
residents;" 5 a relocation assistance program for commercial and
manufacturing tenants displaced by residential conversions was established;" ' 6 the Artist-in-Residence (AIR) program was statutorily sanc-

106. Laber & Kretchmer, supra note 61, at 37.
107. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. §§ 111-10, -11 (1983); see supra note 66.
108. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 111-103 (1983); see supra note 66.
109. Laber & Kretchmer, supra note 61, at 37. See generally infra notes 133-48
and accompanying text (discussing article 7-B).
110. BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33, at I (Supp. 1981).
Ill. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. §§ 15-11, -11 (1983).
112. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 15-112 (1982); BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra
note 33, at 70.
113. BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33, at 50-52, 145-48. Although the
amount of protected manufacturing space was reduced by only 7.5 million square
feet, the new mixed-use zones contain space currently occupied by industry that
is now convertible. Because conversion to residential use in these commercial zones
remains as of right, considerably more than 7.5 million additional square feet is
available for legal conversion. Bailinson, supra note 28, at 109-11.
114. BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33, at 51-52, 58-61. Four types of
mixed-use districts were created in which residential conversion was allowed but
was subjected to limits. Id. at 58-61. Of particular importance is the requirement
that a specified amount of equivalent space must be preserved for commercial or
manufacturing uses either in the building to be converted or in any comparable
building in the mixed-use district. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 15-211 (1983). The
preservation is to be accomplished by a deed restriction running with the land. Id.
§ 15-214 (1983). See generally BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33, at 14 (Supp.
1981) (reprinting a Mar. 10, 1981 memo from the Office of Counsel, City Planning
Commission, captioned "Validity and Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants," required by the zoning resolution).
115. BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33 at 53.
116. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. §§ 15-50 to -58 (1983).
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tioned;1 7 "sandwiching" of residential and non-residential uses in
the same building was allowed;" 8 and a new variance procedure for
mixed-use zones was established. 1 9 The new density and light and
air standards were made applicable to Manhattan Community Districts one through six, 20-substantially all of Manhattan south of
59th Street.' 2' SoHo, NoHo, and Tribeca, however, remained under
their own special zoning provisions. 122 The only important application
of the April 9, 1981 amendments to these zoning districts was in
subjecting conversions to the relocation assistance program 2 1--one
117. BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33, at 53, 63. The Artists-in-Residence
("AIR") program was originally created in 1961 by agreement among a number
of New York City agencies and the Artist Tenants Association. SPECIAL SPACE,
supra note 31, at 59. The current participants must be certified as artists by the
Department of Cultural Affairs. Id. at 57. Four criteria are used in granting
certification of an artist: (1) The applicant must be "engaged in the fine arts,
creative arts or performing arts regularly and on a professional basis," "professional" referring not to "financial remuneration," but rather to the "nature of
the commitment" of the applicant; (2) the applicant must be "serious" and "consistent" in his or her commitment; (3) the applicant must be "currently engaged"
in his or her "art form;" and (4) the applicant must need a "large loft space"
for his or her art form. Application for Artist Certification, Artist Certification
Committee, Department of Cultural Affairs (undated). The tenants then sign commercial leases, but the tenant may not be evicted for living in an AIR unit. SPECIAL
SPACE, supra note 31, at 59. In order to participate, the artist also must submit
to the Department of Buildings an application signed by the building's landlord.
Id. at 59-60. The requirements for this application vary by zoning district, id., but
no building may have more than two AIR units. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 1210(c) (1981).
The 1981 zoning amendments were the first legislative recognition of any kind
of the AIR program, which was based on the 1961 agreement, not a statute. The
1981 amendments provide AIR with a statutory status by adding to the definition
of "accessory use:" "(c) living or sleeping accommodations in connection with
commercial or manufacturing uses, including living or sleeping accommodations in
connection with [a studio]." Id. § 12-10 (1981) (emphasis added).
118. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 15-022 (1983). Before section 15-022 was added
to the zoning resolution, non-residential uses in commercial districts could not be
located over residential units in some commercial districts or above the first floor
in others. Id. § 32-42 (1982).
119. BALANCING THE EQUITIES, supra note 33, at 54-55; N.Y. CITY ZONING RES.
§ 74-782 (1983). Now, in the mixed-use districts, property owners cannot seek a
variance from the Board of Standards and Appeals until they have first tried to
obtain a special permit from the City Planning Commission. BALANCING THE
EQUITIES, supra note 33, at 54. If the special permit is denied, the BSA will have
the record of the Commission's proceeding before it. Id. at 54-55. This new procedure
is intended to discourage the ready granting of variances, for which the BSA is
infamous. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
120. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. §§ 15-00, 15-23 (1983).
121.

CITY

PLANNING

COMMISSION,

CITY

OF

COMMUNITY DISTRICTS (Jan. 1977).
122. N.Y. CITY ZONING REs. § 15-01 (1983).

123. Id. § 51-012.

NEW

YORK,

MAP

OF MANHATTAN
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of the most important provisions of the 1981 zoning amendments. 124
Since contributions to the program are mandatory for owners planning to convert loft buildings to residential use, 25 conversions will
become more expensive and may be discouraged. 126 These changes
were part of the city's ambitious seven-point plan,127 and once they
were passed only the residential status legislation element of the
28
seven-point plan remained to be enacted.
The New York City Department of City Planning, in an early
study of the conversion process, 29 stated that the Tribeca Mixed
Use District "was intended to give the general public the opportunity
to create loft residences in compliance with all regulations and zoning
requirements."' 3 0 Neither the Tribeca nor the SoHo and NoHo
amendments, however, did anything to halt illegal conversion in
those districts.' The success of the latest zoning amendments is still
being tested, but it seems unlikely that they will be responsible for
any greater degree of compliance with statutory requirements, such
as the Zoning Resolution, than previous efforts. After all, the basic
economic and political forces that encouraged illegal conversion
remain constants in the city.'
B.

Article 7-B & Article 27

Article 7-B, first added to the MDL in 1964,'" was a recognition
by the New York State Legislature of the special needs of New
York City artists. 3 4 As stated in the legislative findings:
It is hereby declared and found that persons regularly engaged
in the arts require larger amounts of space for the pursuit of
124. Id. § 15-51; see §§ 15-52 to -58. Conversions north of 59th Street and in
other boroughs must provide similar benefits if J-51 tax benefits, see infra note
147, are applied for. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § J51-2.5(z) (Williams Supp. 1985).
Section J51-2.5(z) was added pursuant to authority granted to the city by the state.
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 489 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1986).
125. N.Y.

CITY

ZONING RES. § 15-51 (1983).

126. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1981, at B5, col. 4.
127. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 330-425 and accompanying text.
129. RESIDENTIAL RE-USE, supra note 28.
130. Id. at 39.
131. Laber & Kretchmer, supra note 61, at 37. See generally supra notes 62-83
and accompanying text (discussing the incidence and advantages of illegal conversion).
132. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
133. SPECIAL SPACE, supra note 31, at 21.
134. Article 7-B was restricted to cities in New York of "more than one million
persons," N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 277 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1986), of
which New York City is the only example.
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their artistic endeavors . . .that the financial remunerations to
be obtained from pursuit of a career in the arts is [sic] generally
small, [and] that as the result of such limited financial remuneration persons regularly engaged in the arts generally find it
financially impossible to maintain quarters for the pursuit of their
artistic endeavors separate and apart from their places of residence
135

In addition to finding that artists have special needs, the state
legislature found that artists "enhanced" the "cultural life" of New
York City. 3 6 To encourage conversions for artists, article 7-B imposes
less restrictive health and safety standards than does the balance of
the Multiple Dwelling Law. The article, however, is not effective
without supporting local zoning ordinances.' 3 7 New York City did
not enact the local zoning ordinances necessary to give effect to
article 7-B until 1971, when the SoHo amendments in the Zoning
Resolution were passed. 3 '
As originally enacted in 1964, article 7-B was quite restrictive. Its
application was limited not merely to spaces occupied by artists who
had been certified by the Department of Cultural Affairs, 31 9 but
even more narrowly to only those artists in the "visual fine arts."'40
Furthermore, article 7-B forbade mixing manufacturing and residential uses in the same building and allowed commerical use only
in the cellar or ground floor.' 14 Finally, although the MDL health
and safety regulations were eased, fire-protection rules remained
42
major obstacles to compliance.
In 1965, 1968, and 1971, article 7-B was amended,' 143 and in 1977
a fully revised version was passed.' 44 Article 7-B no longer applied
solely to the joint living-working quarters of certified artists. It
applied now to "general residential purposes" as well, although as

135. Id.

§

275 (McKinney Supp. 1986).

136. Id.
137. Section 277 of article 7-B provides that units may be occupied "except as
otherwise required by the local zoning law or resolution." Id. § 277. Therefore,

if there is a conflict between article 7-B and the local zoning resolution, the local
zoning resolution overrides article 7-B. Id. This was explicitly acknowledged in the
1980 revisions to the Legislative Findings. Id. § 275 (McKinney Supp. 1986).

138. SPECIAL SPACE, supra note 31, at 27.
139. Laber & Kretchmer, supra note 61, at 37.
140. 1964 N.Y. Laws ch. 939, § 276.
141. Id. § 277.
142. Fire protection rules are stringent and converting a loft in conformity with
them is expensive. SPECIAL SPACE, supra note 31, at 23.
143. Id.at 24.
144. Id.at 24-25.
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a precondition to the availability of article 7-B, the building must
have been occupied "for loft, commercial, institutional, public, community facility or manufacturing purposes" at "any time prior" to
January 1, 1977. 4 1 A number of different, optional standards for
light, air, egress, and fire safety were provided,'14 so that most
projects would be able to comply with the MDL without resorting

to a variance granted by the Board of Standards and Appeals. 147
145. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 277 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1986). Prior to
1964, the law required the building to have been "occupied exclusively for" such
purposes, id. (McKinney 1974) (emphasis added), which rendered article 7-B unavailable to buildings partially converted before 1977.
146. Laber & Kretchmer summarize the amended article's approach to minimal
light and air standards as an example of the new options it creates:
In place of minimum rear yard requirements of thirty feet for any midblock residential building, under the new law, to provide adequate light
and air, it suffices that the dwelling unit faces upon a street, or a court
or a rear yard, without requiring that every building have a rear yard.
Laber & Kretchmer, supra note 61, at 37, col. 2 (emphasis added).
147. Id. For a discussion of the variance procedure and its problems, see supra
note 63 and accompanying text.
There have been other legislative measures, most notably J-51, section 352-ee,
and section 235-d.
Section J-51-2.5 of the New York City Administrative Code was first passed in
1955 to encourage the rehabilitation of existing housing. RESIDENTIAL RE-USE, supra
note 28, at 39. "Tax incentives were offered to encourage owners of older multiple
dwellings to install central heating, to replace inadequate plumbing facilities and
to eliminate hazardous conditions." Id. An alternative tax exemption provision is
found in section 421-a of the Real Property Tax Law, which is available only if
no other tax exemption is concurrently being used. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW
§ 421-a(c)(i) (McKinney 1984). In 1976, an important amendment to J-51, which
extended the program to the "conversion of non-residential buildings and to buildings
with one or two dwelling units over commercial space," became effective. RESIDENTtAL RE-USE, supra note 28, at 40. In 1976, 68 of 87 conversions were eligible
for J-51 benefits. Id. at 9. Of those eligible, 66.6%70 applied, and 90.9% of those
applying received benefits. Id.. There has been some controversy about the importance of J-51 in encouraging legal loft conversions. Zukin writes that:
[tihe general effects of J-51 on the loft market were, first, to insert a
new category of loft-apartments at typical upper-middle-income rents
beside the more marginal submarket of convert-it-yourself loft space and,
second, to spread residential conversion into neighborhoods where the
zoning resolutions of 1971 and 1976 did not permit loft living.
ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 56; cf. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 39, at 83 n.10
(placing less importance on J-51 tax benefits). Zukin asserts that the 1975 amendments to J-51 had the effect of making conversions of large buildings, rather than
the previous upgrading of smaller buildings, eligible for tax abatements, and thus
encouraged large-scale conversions. ZUKIN, supra note 26, at 56. The New York
City Department of City Planning speculates that the "elimination of J-51 tax
benefits would [not] necessarily preclude legal loft conversion. It is likely that
developers would pay less for buildings since this is a changeable cost and building
improvements are not." PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 39, at 83 n.10.
Restrictions on J-51 tax exemption and abatements, passed in May, 1981, Korngold, How Changes in J-51 Law Affect Loft Conversions to Apartments, N.Y.L.J.,
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Article 7-B was recodified as Article 27 to the Arts and Cultural
Affairs Law as of December 31, 1983.1" The content of Article 27
is identical to that of article 7-B, except for the numbering of the
sections. As the case law discussed in this Article refers to the old
article 7-B, all references herein will be to article 7-B and not article

27.
III.

The Case Law

While the city and state governments have dealt hesitatingly with
the zoning 49 and statutory issues'50 concerning illegal loft residences,
the courts have not had such a luxury. Since 1975, a steady stream
of landlords and tenants have sought the intervention of the courts,
and the courts have created a body of case law that will continue
to provide the only protection to an indeterminate number of illegal
tenants not covered by the new article 7-C.111 The highest state court

June 17, 1981, at 1, col. 3, set up in Manhattan a minimum tax zone, a tax
abatement exclusion zone, and a zone in which all J-51 benefits are excluded. Id.
at 3, col. 1. And in the Spring of 1983, the future of the J-51 program was
unclear. The New York State Assembly was willing to extend the program, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 17, 1983, at 39, col. 1, while the New York State Senate was less
enthusiastic, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1983, at B4, col. 1.
The addition of section 352-ee to the General Business Law prevents the New
York State Attorney General from accepting for filing any cooperative or condominium offering or prospectus that involves conversion of non-residential space
to residential space unless certain requirements are filled. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 352-ee (McKinney 1978). The most important requirement makes acceptance dependent upon the submission of building plans approved under section 300 of the
MDL. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-ee.l(i) (McKinney Supp. 1982). The Building
Department will not approve building plans under section 300 until zoning approval
has been obtained. Lehner, Sweet & Allen, supra note 88, at 32. This new requirement
should discourage illegal conversions which, between 1975 and 1978, could be filed
with the New York Attorney General, even though they were illegal. Laber &
Kretchmer, supra note 61, at 38. Cooperative sales had occurred before 1975 without
any offering plan being filed with the Attorney General. Id.
In 1978, the Legislature added section 235-d to the Real Property Law. N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 235-d (McKinney Supp. 1986). This is an anti-harassment
provision applicable to any alleged harassment of a tenant in a building used at
any time for "manufacturing or warehouse purposes," so long as there was no
certificate of occupancy in effect when the alleged harassment occurred. N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 235-d.1, 235-d.3 (McKinney Supp. 1986). Absent section 235-d,
harassment by a landlord would be a common law tort in New York State. See
34 N.Y. JuR. Torts of the Landlord § 304 (1964).
148. 1983 N.Y. Laws 876, § 1. Sections 27.01, .03, .05 and .07 of article 27
are sections 275, 276, 277 and 278, respectively of article 7-B.
149. See supra notes 95-132 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 133-48 and accompanying text; infra notes 316-98 and
accompanying text.
151. Article 7-C is the residential status legislation for illegal loft residents passed
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to decide an issue of substance has been the appellate division. The
New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, has yet to
do more in the area of illegal lofts than to deny appeals.
The lower courts have balanced the competing interests of landlord
and tenant, stressing the importance of determining the landlord's
role in the conversion process.' 5 2 Where the landlord has known of
the conversion and encouraged it, courts have found that converted
buildings with three or more residential tenants are de facto multiple
dwellings;' 53 that the tenants, therefore, have rights under the MDL;
and that, where there are six or more residential tenants in a de
facto multiple dwelling,' 5 4 the tenants are protected by the Rent
Stabilization Law. 55
The typical loft tenant in the cases discussed below had signed
a nonresidential loft lease for a long term, at a low rent; 11 6 the
lease restricted the uses of the loft to those allowed by the law'
or to a specified nonresidential use such as an artist's studio.', 8 In
many of the cases in which the substantive law has developed,' 5 9
the tenants themselves had invested a substantial sum of money or
by the New York State Legislature in June, 1982. See infra notes 383-424 and
accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 241-57 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 163-240 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 274-304 and accompanying text.
155. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ YY51-1.0 to -7.0 (Williams 1975 & Supp. 198586).
156. See, e.g., Mandel v. Pitkowsky, 102 Misc. 2d 478, 479-80, 425 N.Y.S.2d
926, 927-28 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1979), aff'd mem., 76 A.D.2d 807, 429
N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1980).
157. See, e.g., Ellis v. Cordes, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 1979, at 14, col. 5 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1979).
158. See, e.g., Lipkus v. Pikus, 99 Misc. 2d 518, 519, 416 N.Y.S.2d 694, 695
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 72 A.D.2d 697, 421 N.Y.S.2d 825 (lst
Dep't 1979), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 874, 414 N.E.2d 399, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1019

(1980).
159. Illegal loft cases of primarily procedural or remedial importance include
Childress v. Lipkus, 72 A.D.2d 724, 443 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1st Dep't 1979) (tenants
motion for preliminary injunction to restrain holdover proceeding denied by supreme
court because tenants could raise legal and equitable claims as defenses in civil
court); Duane Thomas Loft Tenants Ass'n v. Sylvan Lawrence Co., 117 Misc. 2d
360, 458 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (preliminary injunction to
restrain holdover proceedings granted to tenants when tenants had already brought
action in supreme court for reformation of lease and declaratory judgment); Ehrman
v. Consolidated Edison Corp., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 1982, at 6, col. 4 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (tenants in de facto multiple dwelling with six or more
apartments may bring action pursuant to article 7A of Real Property Actions and
Proceedings Law); Bowditch v. 57 Laight St. Corp., I Il Misc. 2d 255, 443 N.Y.S.2d
785 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (plaintiffs granted summary judgment for pos-

session of premises for non-payment against defendant corporation, which had
rented loft building for art studio and residences); Lovell v. 56 E. 11th Realty

19861

ILLEGAL LOFTS

amount of time in converting the building to residential use,16 0 or

had paid "fixture fees" to previous tenants for prior conversions. 16'

Courts have never explicitly relied on the investments that tenants

had made in their living units when ruling in favor of tenants.
Nevertheless, the influence of this financial factor on the courts
cannot be ignored.
A.

62

De Facto Multiple Dwellings

The doctrine of the de facto multiple dwelling arose in the procedural context of the summary proceeding, 63 where a landlord
attempted to evict a tenant either for non-payment of rent (a "nonpayment proceeding"),' 64 for violation of a restrictive use lease clause,
or for violation of the New York City Zoning Resolution or the
MDL (both the lease violation and illegal use proceedings are "hold-

over proceedings").

65

Corp., N.Y.L.J., July 15, 1981, at 11, col. 1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1981)
(declaratory judgment that building was de facto multiple dwelling and that residential units were subject to Rent Stabilization Law granted to tenants); Mercer
St. Lofts, Inc. v. Teti, N.Y.L.J., June 1, 1979, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1979) (preliminary injunction denied to landlord to restrain tenants from performing
further conversion work or continuing their residence), aff'd mem., 78 A.D.2d 783,
435 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1st Dep't 1980). These cases are beyond the scope of this
Article.
160. E.g., Gordon & Gordon v. Madavin, Ltd., 108 Misc. 2d 349, 350, 441
N.Y.S.2d 148, 149 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1981) (landlord must condone or
encourage the tenant's conversion to residential use).
161. 108 Misc. 2d at 350, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 150; Mandel v. Pitkowsky, 102 Misc.
2d 478, 479, 425 N.Y.S.2d 926, 927 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1979), aff'd
mem., 76 A.D.2d 807, 429 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1980).
162. For decisions in which the courts' discussions of the facts stress the substantial
investment of time and money by the tenants, see, e.g., Madavin, 108 Misc. 2d
at 350, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 149-50; Mandel, 102 Misc. 2d at 479, 425 N.Y.S.2d at
927.
163. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1986). Summary
proceedings, called "special proceedings" in New York State, allow the landlord
to proceed swiftly against a tenant rather than to pursue the slow common law

remedy of ejectment. See generally C.

BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP

AND USE

377-

78 (3d ed. 1983). In New York State, ejectment is termed an "action to recover
possession of real property," and is codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW
§§ 601-61 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1982). Mere breach of a covenant, such as that
to pay rent, does not give rise to an ejectment action unless the lease provides
that the breach terminates the lease and allows the landlord to re-enter. 13 CARMODY
WAIT § 89:115 (2d ed. 1966). An ejectment action may be maintained against a
holdover tenant. Id. § 89:118.
164. "A special proceeding may be maintained under this article upon the following grounds: ... 2. The tenant has defaulted in the payment of rent ....

N.Y.

REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW

§ 711.2 (McKinney 1979).

165. "A special proceeding may be maintained under this article upon the following grounds: . . . 5. The premises, or any part thereof, are used or occupied
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Mintz v. Robinson'6 was the first case to imply that a converted
building might be a de facto multiple dwelling. The court specifically
held that a living loft building occupied prior to January 1, 1964167

"exclusively for manufacturing purposes, or commercial purposes,
or both, and which is now occupied by artists for residential purposes
and for the pursuit of the artist's artistic endeavors," is subject to
the registration requirements of § 325 of the MDL.'"

... for any illegal trade or manufacture, or other illegal business." N.Y. REAL
PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711.5 (McKinney 1979). The New York courts refer to a
section 711.5 special proceeding as a "holdover proceeding." E.g., Nationwide
Record Storage v. Greenberg, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 11, col. 6 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1978). Some commentators have used the term "illegal use" to
characterize a special proceeding under section 711.5 and "holdover" to characterize
a special proceeding under secton 711.1 of the New York Real Property Actions
and Proceedings Law. E.g., J.RASCH, NEW YoRK LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1106
(2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as RASCH]; see also infra note 278 (discussing section
711.1). A section 711.1 proceeding can be brought when a tenant remains in
possession after the lease expires. See infra note 278.
166. 81 Misc. 2d 447, 366 N.Y.S.2d 547 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1975).
167. Before its amendment in 1977, article 7-B of the MDL gave artists permission
to occupy buildings for both "residential purposes" and the "pursuit of the artists'
artistic endeavors" when the buildings were used for manufacturing and/or commercial purposes prior to January 1, 1964. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 277
(McKinney 1974), amended by N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 277 (McKinney Supp.
1983).
168. 81 Misc. 2d at 449, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 550. Section 325 provides:
1.Every owner of a multiple dwelling . . . shall file in the department
a notice containing his name, address and a description of the premises,
... and also the number of apartments . . .and the number of families
occupying the apartments ....

2. In any city of over one million which, by local law, requires the
registration of owners of multiple dwellings and which prescribes penalties,
remedies, and sanctions to be imposed for the violation of such local
registration requirements, no rent shall be recovered by the owner of a
multiple dwelling who fails to comply with such registration requirements
until he complies with such requirements.
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 325.1, .2 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1986).
The applicable "local law" is the New York City Administrative Code. Section
D26-41.01 requires registration and the Code provides in section D26-41.21-b that:
[a]n owner who is required to file a statement of registration under this
article and who fails to file as required shall be denied the right to
recover possession of the premises for non-payment of rent during the
period of non-compliance, and shall, in the discretion of the court, suffer
a stay of proceedings to recover rents, during such period. In any action
to recover possession under section 711 of the real property actions and
proceedings law, the owner shall set forth his registration number issued
by the department, and shall allege that he has filed a statement of
registration ....

N.Y. CITY

ADMIN.

CODE

§ D26-41.21-b (Williams 1977).
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The landlord in Mintz had brought a summary proceeding to evict
the tenants for nonpayment of rent.' 69 The tenants argued that the
building was a multiple dwelling, that registration as a multiple
dwelling is an essential element of a summary proceeding, and that
the landlord's action should be dismissed because the building was
not registered.7 0 The court accepted this argument. First, the court
found that there were three tenants in the building, "living independently of each other, occupying three dwellings,"' 7 ' and that
"ordinarily" three or more tenants were statutorily sufficient to
make a building a multiple dwelling. 72 The court did not rely,
however, on the number of tenants. It found that the defendant
tenant Robinson, was an artist certified by the New York City
Department of Cultural Affairs, and that joint living and working

in this building was permitted under article 7-B of the Multiple
Dwelling Law. 73 The building, however, did not have the registration
number'74 which section 278 of article 7-B'7 requires. 176
By focusing on the landlord's failure to register the building as

a multiple dwelling, a failure the landlord can attempt to rectify,
the Mintz holding provided limited protection for even the certified
169. Mintz, 81 Misc. 2d 447, 366 N.Y.S.2d 547. One of the puzzling questions
about Mintz is why it was tried in Kings County, instead of in the New York
County Civil Court. The record does not reveal any reason. Presumably the building
was in New York County (Manhattan); in 1975, the date of the case, the only
area in New York City for which the zoning amendment necessary to give article
7-B effect had been passed was in SoHo in Manhattan. See BALNCIN TH EQurrms,
supra note 33, at 26, 27. Venue in a summary proceeding is in the county where
the real property is located, N.Y. CITY CrvIL COURT ACT § 303 (McKinney 1963),
but venue may be waived. Id. § 306. This must have occurred in Mintz.
170. Mintz, 81 Misc. 2d at 447, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 448, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
173. Id. For a discussion of article 7-B, see supra notes 134-47 and accompanying
text.
174. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
175. "In addition to the provisions of this article [7-13, the following enumerated
articles ...

shall ...

apply to such buildings: Article ...

8. Requirements and

remedies [which includes sections 301 and 3021. 9. Registry of names and service
of papers [which includes section 3251." N.Y. MULT. DwELL. LAw § 278 (McKinney
Supp. 1986). Two later Appellate Term cases affirmed the Mintz holding that
registration of a multiple dwelling is an essential element of a summary proceeding
and extended it to all multiple dwellings, not just article 7-B dwellings. Mandel v.
Pitkowsky, 102 Misc. 2d 478, 425 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1979),
aff'd mem., 76 A.D.2d 807, 429 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1980); 155 Wooster
Street Assocs. v. Bengis, N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1979, at 12, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. App. T.
1st Dep't 1979).
176. Mintz, 81 Misc. 2d at 447, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
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artist. 177 Moreover, the Mintz holding offered no protection to nonartists because of the court's reliance on the special circumstances
that the tenant was an artist occupying a joint living-working space78
under article 7-B. This became clear in McClelland v. 79Robinson,
in which neither of the tenants was a certified artist.'
The tenants in McClelland were sued by the landlord for nonpayment of rent.8 0 The court found that the landlord either "knew"
that the tenants "intended to use the premises ... for residential

purposes," or that he at least "deliberately" avoided clarifying the
situation once the tenants informed him they were going to so use
the premises.' 8' The court balanced the landlord's actions against
the tenants' knowledge that "the right to reside in the premises was,
at the least, questionable."'' 8 2 Given the tenants' "illegal conduct"
177. H. STULTS & R. EISENBERO, RIGHTS OF RESIDENTIAL LoFT TENANTS 27 (1979).
Unlike the provisions creating standards for a certificate of occupancy, see supra
note 63, the statutory provisions imposing a registration requirement, N.Y. CITY
ADMIN. CODE § D26-41.01 to -41.25 (Williams 1977 & Supp. 1985), do not on
their face require compliance with the MDL, the Zoning Resolution or the Building
Code. In practice, however, the Building Department only issues registration numbers
when a building is "legally" occupied. See Corbin v. Harris, 92 Misc. 2d 480,
481, 400 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1977). Summary proceedings
continue to fail because buildings do not have a registration number. E.g., Mandel
v. Pitkowsky, 102 Misc. 2d 478, 480, 425 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928 (Sup. Ct. App. T.
1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 76 A.D.2d 807, 429 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1979); Laight
Coop. Corp. v. Kenny, 105 Misc. 2d 1001, 1003, 430 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
178. 94 Misc. 2d at 309, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 164 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1978).
179. Id. at 309, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 163. In 1968 the definition of "artist" in
section 276 of the article 7-B was amended to encompass not only people in the
"fine arts" but also people in "the performing or creative arts." 1968 N.Y. Laws
900. Commercial artists were excluded because it was thought that they did not
need large amounts of space to work in. SPECIAL SPACE, supra note 31, at 24.
Architects would seem to be excluded from the definition of "artist" and thus
not even be potentially certifiable. This point was not raised, however, in McClelland.
180. McClelland, 94 Misc. 2d at 309, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
181. 94 Misc. 2d at 309-10, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
182. Id. at 310, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 164. The court looked to the lease and the
circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the lease in determining that the
tenants must have known that the "right to reside" was "questionable." Id. The
lease was a Real Estate Board Form of Loft Lease, which provided that the premises
were to be used as " '[a] studio and for no other purpose.' " Id. at 309, 405
N.Y.S.2d at 164. This Loft Lease also stated that the "[tlenant will not at any
time use or occupy the demised premises in violation of the certificate of occupancy
issued for the building of which the demised premises are a part." THE REAL
ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, INC., STANDARD FORM OF LOFT LEASE § 15 (1973).
This provision, though not mentioned by the court, would further support its
conclusion.
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in converting the loft,183 the landlord was not estopped from suing

for nonpayment.8 4 Furthermore, the tenants could not, by their own
illegal conduct, create the claim that the building was a de facto
multiple dwelling.' Therefore, the tenants could not prevent the
landlord's collection of rent on the basis that the building lacked

a certificate of occupancy. 8 6 Finally, the court noted that a landlord
may not waive his right to remove a tenant for "residing there in
violation of law,"'8 17 and granted judgment for the landlord. The
183. 94 Misc. 2d at 310, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 164. The tenants did not obtain the
landlord's written permission to alter the premises, as required by paragraph 3 of
the lease, nor did they obtain approval from the appropriate city agencies for the
remodelling. Id. The tenants, therefore, did not come to the court with "clean
hands." Id.
184. Id. The tenants argued that because the landlord had knowingly allowed
them to convert their premises to residences, he was estopped from asserting that
they lacked written permission to make the conversion. Id. at 309, 405 N.Y.S.2d
at 164.
185. Id. at 310, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
186. The tenants argued that the building lacked a multiple dwelling certificate
of occupancy, necessary for a summary proceeding. Id. at 309, 405 N.Y.S.2d at
164. The tenants cited section 325 of the MDL and section D26-41.01 of the New
York City Administrative Code. Id. See generally supra note 168 (discussing section
325 of the MDL).
187. McClelland, 94 Misc. 2d at 310, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 164 (citing RASCH, supra
note 165, § 1114). A more cateful reading of sections 1107 and 1108 of RASCH
would have revealed to the McClelland court that the general New York rule is
that the violation justifying dispossession for illegal use "must be a violation of
statutory law dealing with health, morals, or welfare or safety of the public."
RASCH, supra note 165, § 1107. Furthermore, "if it is the landlord's obligation to
comply with the statutory requirement [obtaining a residential certificate of occupancy],
then the landlord's failure to comply with the law cannot be made the basis for
transforming a perfectly legitimate business or occupancy into an unlawful one."
Id. § 1108. A distinction must be made between a use which is illegal per se, see
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711.5 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1983) (operating
a bawdy house); cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 230.0-.40, 240.45 (McKinney 1980 & Supp.
1986) (prostitution and criminal nuisance), and a use which is illegal only because no
residential certificate of occupancy has been obtained or because the use constitutes

a zoning violation. See

RASCH,

supra note 165, §§ 25, 28-30. A landlord can

successfully void a lease only when the use is "unlawful under all circumstances,"

id. § 25, not when the illegal use can be corrected. Id. §§ 28, 30. By analogy,

one would expect that a landlord should be able to maintain an illegal use proceeding
only in the same circumstances.
In a non-payment proceeding brought when the tenant stops paying rent, often
in protest against inadequate services, SPECIAL SPACE, supra note 31, at 75, 76,
one can easily understand why the courts do not discuss the waiver issue, even if
they accept the McClelland analysis. Although this is an eviction proceeding, the

tenant can avoid the eviction by depositing with the court the rent and any court
costs at any time before the judge has issued an official warrant of eviction to

the city marshall. See N.Y.

REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 751 (McKinney 1981).
The tenant in the typical non-payment illegal loft case, therefore, does not have
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but, in

In Lipkis v. Pikus 89 (Lipkis 1), Judge Cohen presented one of
to cure the underlying illegality of residence itself to avoid eviction; all he has to
do is pay the rent. This situation is distinguished from those in which eviction is
delayed to give the tenant a reasonable time to correct the violation. In the typical
non-payment proceeding, the landlord is seeking to collect the rent, not to evict
the tenant for an illegal use. One would expect the typical court to be less sympathetic
to a landlord who wants to collect money rather than cure the underlying illegality.
On the above reasoning, one would expect landlords to have a much stronger
claim for a holdover proceeding than for a non-payment proceeding against an
illegal loft resident under a McClelland analysis, even though McClelland was a
non-payment case. In general, however, the courts have not followed the McClelland
analysis and landlords have not been markedly more successful in evicting tenants
in holdover proceedings than in non-payment proceedings. Reasons for this include
the fact that courts are hesitant to evict tenants when the illegal residential conversion
occurred with the landlord's knowledge and encouragement and at a considerable
cost in time and/or money to the tenant. See supra note 162. These circumstances
are typical in illegal loft cases.
188. Tarkington Assoc. v. Spilner, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1978, at 10, col. 3 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1977), is in accord with the approach of McClelland. In
McClelland, the landlord allegedly had no residential certificate of occupancy, 94
Misc. 2d at 309, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 164, while in Tarkington the landlord was alleged
not to have registered the building as a multiple dwelling. Tarkington, N.Y.L.J.,
June 8, 1978, at 10, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1977).
In Tarkington, the tenant's rights in the premises were extinguished when the
building was sold at a foreclosure sale. Id. Tarkington Associates in turn purchased
the building from the purchaser and served a thirty-day notice terminating the
tenant's month-to-month tenancy. Id. The tenant raised the defense that the building
was a de facto multiple dwelling. Id. However, as the "tenant alone, without
participation or written permission of petitioner's predecessor in interest, and without
sanction of the municipality," id. (emphasis added), had converted her loft to a
residence; and since her lease had provided that she could use it as an " 'art studio
only to the extent permitted by law,' " id., she could not use the landlord's failure
to register the building as a defense to the holdover proceeding. Id. Moreover,
the court noted that the tenant was not a certified artist, although it appears from
the opinion that she might have been an artist, albeit an uncertified artist. Cf. id.
(tenant leased space for use as an "art studio").
The tenant, in addition to citing the MDL and the New York City Administrative
Code, see supra notes 167-68, also cited the New York City Civil Court Rules to
establish that without a registration statement, the landlord could not maintain a
summary proceeding against tenants in a de facto multiple dwelling:
In every summary proceeding brought to recover possession of real
property, pursuant to section 711 of the Real Property Actions and
Proceedings Law, the petitioner shall allege either (1) that the premises
are not a multiple dwelling, or; (2) that the premises are a multiple
dwelling and pursuant to the Administrative Code, Article 41, there is
The petitioner
a currently effective registration statement on file ....
shall also allege . . . the multiple dwelling registration number ....

N.Y. CITY CrV. CT. PRc. R. § 2900.21(f) (superseded and recodified at McKinney 1986 New York Rules of Court § 208.42(g) (22 NYCRR § 208.42(g)).
189. 96 Misc. 2d 581, 409 N.Y.S.2d 598 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1978),
modified, 99 Misc. 2d 518, 416 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. App. T. ist Dep't), aff'd,

19861

ILLEGAL LOFTS

the most thoughtful and complete considerations of the problem of
illegal lofts offered by any court, considerably expanding the protection the courts offer to loft tenants. The opinion, however, is
flawed by a major inconsistency in its reasoning. As a result, the
opinion yields a strained result. 90 The tenants in Lipkis I were all
certified as artists by the New York City Department of Cultural
Affairs, 9' and thus were entitled under article 7-B to occupy joint
living-working lofts. 192 When the landlord brought a nonpayment
proceeding, the tenants raised the defense that the buildings were
de facto multiple dwellings and that the landlord, lacking an effective
multiple dwelling registration statement and residential certificate of

occupancy, could not maintain this summary proceeding. 93
The court found that the landlord both knew of and "encouraged"
the tenants' use of the premises as residences.1 94 This conduct had,
in effect, modified the commercial leases that had been signed,
making their terms those of residential leases. 95 This modification,
in addition to the presence of three tenants in each of the buildings
in question, led the court to hold that these were multiple dwellings. 96
In its opinion, the Lipkis I court distinguished Tarkington Associates v. Spilner'97 and McClelland v. Robinson'98 on the ground
72 A.D.2d 697, 421 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1979), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 874, 414
N.E.2d 399, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1980).
190. See infra notes 200, 201 and accompanying text.
191. 96 Misc. 2d at 586, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
192. Id. at 584-85, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 600. See generally supra notes 133-47 and
accompanying text (discussing article 7-B).
193. 96 Misc. 2d at 587, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
194. Id. at 589-90, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 602-03.
195. Id. at 590, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 603 (citing Nationwide Record Storage v.
Greenberg, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 11, col. 6 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1978)); see infra notes 206-23 and accompanying text. Judge Cohen clarified the
statutory reasoning behind Nationwide. First, he paraphrased the definition of
"multiple dwelling" in the MDL as " 'a dwelling which is either rented, leased,
let or hired out, to be occupied, or is occupied as the residence or home of three
or more families living independently of one another.' " 96 Misc. 2d at 588, 409
N.Y.S.2d at 602; see N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4.7 (McKinney 1974). Then Judge
Cohen looked to the definition of "occupied:" "Wherever the word or words
'occupied,' 'is occupied,' 'used' or 'is used' appear, such word or words shall be
construed as if followed by the words 'or is intended, arranged or designed to be
used or occupied.' " 96 Misc. 2d at 588, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 602; see N.Y. MULT.
DWELL. LAW § 4.1 (McKinney 1974). A landlord, aware of and consenting to a
conversion to a residence, thus "intended, arranged or designed" that the building
be "occupied."
196. 96 Misc. 2d at 590, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
197. N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1978, at 10, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1977).
See generally supra note 188.
198. 94 Misc. 2d 308, 405 N.Y.S.2d 163 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
See generally supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
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that the Lipkis I tenants had not converted commercial space into
residences, as had the tenants in the two earlier cases. Instead, the
Lipkis I tenants had occupied "substantially habitable" premises
converted by previous tenants and offered to them by the landlord.,"
The court overlooked that one tenant, Pikus, had made the conversion himself. 2° ° When the court discussed Pikus, it looked to the
same factors it had looked to with respect to the other tenants and
held that Pikus' building was a multiple dwelling, as were the other
buildings.

20 1

The Lipkis I court held that the landlord was barred from collecting
any of the rent for which he had sued because he had not obtained
a residential certificate of occupancy for his buildings. 202 This was
a drastic remedy; the landlord was forced to obtain a residential
certificate of occupancy, a process that can be time-consuming and
expensive, 20 3 while being deprived of any rental income with which
199. 96 Misc. 2d at 590, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
200. Id. at 586, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
201. Id. at 595-96, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 606. Judge Cohen rejected an argument by
the landlord that Pikus could not use his own illegal occupancy to establish the
multiple dwelling status of the building. Id. at 597, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 607. Making
a distinction similar to that made in Nationwide, see infra notes 206-17 and
accompanying text, Judge Cohen noted that the landlord was seeking not removal
of the tenants, but only payment of rent. 96 Misc. 2d at 596, 409 N.Y.S.2d at
607. Lipkis I, then, raised, but did not answer, the question of whether the courts
should draw a distinction between holdover proceedings and non-payment proceedings. Id. at 597, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
202. 96 Misc. 2d at 594, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 605. Judge Cohen, in support of this
proposition, cited not only section 325.2 of the MDL and section D26-41.21-b of
the New York City Administrative Code, but also sections 301 and 302 of the
MDL, which provide:
No multiple dwelling shall be occupied in whole or in part until the
issuance of a certificate by the department that said dwelling conforms
in all respects to the requirements of this chapter, to the building code
and rules and to all other applicable law ....
l.a. If any dwelling or structure be occupied in whole or in part for
human habitation in violation of section three hundred one, during such
unlawful occupation .

...

b. No rent shall be recovered by the owner of such premises for said
period, and no action or special proceeding shall be maintained therefore,
or for possession of said premises for non-payment of such rent.
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 301(l), 302(l)(a), (b) (McKinney 1974). See generally
supra note 63 (discussing residential certificate of occupancy). Sections 301 and
302 turn on whether the building has a residential certificate of occupancy, while
section 325 turns on whether the building has a multiple dwelling registration
statement. See generally supra notes 168, 177 (discussion of registration statements
and method of obtaining them).
203. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. In addition to the holdings
discussed in the text of this article, the Lipkis I court found that the statutorily
implied warranty of habitability under section 235-b of New York's Real Property
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to pay for repairs or additions. In holding that the building was a
de facto multiple dwelling the court made all the MDL provisions
applicable to joint living-working quarters, 204 rather than relying on

the Mintz court's narrow application of article 7-B. 205 Finally, the
Lipkis I decision supplied both non-certified artists and non-artists
with the same argument formerly available only to certified artiststhat their buildings are de facto multiple dwellings.
In Nationwide Record Storage, Inc. v. Greenberg,206 the New York

County Civil Court took an approach different from that taken in
McClelland 207 or Lipkis I. The landlord in Nationwide brought a
holdover proceeding to remove several tenants for "continous illegal
occupancy." 2 8 The landlord conceded that he "procured, knew of
and consented to the occupancies for residential purposes, ' ' 20 9 a
concession similar to the finding of fact in McClelland.210 The lan-

dlord, through his concessions, was held to have leased more than
two lofts as residences; therefore, the building, was found, in dictum,
to be a de facto multiple dwelling.

1

Law covered these tenants, although there was not enough evidence to determine
the damages. In regard to the damages the court did note, however, that the
"forfeiture of rent adequately compensates the tenants for [any] damages ..
96 Misc. 2d at 597, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
204. Section 278 does not make the general provisions of article three of the
MDL applicable to joint living-working quarters. See N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW
§ 278 (McKinney Supp. 1983). Article three includes such provisions as section 78,
which mandates that a multiple dwelling be kept in "good repair," id. § 78, and
section 79, which requires that a multiple dwelling be provided with a certain level
of heat at certain times. Id. § 79.
205. See supra notes 166-77 and accompanying text.
206. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 11, col. 6 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
207. McClelland v. Robinson, 94 Misc. 2d 308, 405 N.Y.S.2d 163 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
208. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 11, col. 6.
209. Id.
210. 94 Misc. 2d at 309-10, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
211. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 12, col. 1. The decision in Nationwide actually
rested on the narrower ground of the landlord's failure to present evidence to
support his allegation that the tenancy was illegal. Id. As Judge Sinclair wrote,
"Other than testimony by the [landlord], unsupported by documentary or other
evidence, that the building was a commercial one, no proof of non-compliance
with the applicable laws was before the court." Id. A report of search by the
Department of Rent and Housing Maintenance of the Housing and Development
Administration showed that the building was not a multiple dwelling; but the report
was dated March 2, 1973, and, therefore, did not cover the period subsequent to
the commencement of this action. Id. In order to establish illegal residential use
the landlord was required to prove that the "physical condition of the premises"
did not satisfy one or more provisions of the MDL, the Zoning Resolution, or
the New York City Administrative Code. The landlord failed to do so. Id. The
Nationwide court went on to note that even if there were a violation, the landlord
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The Nationwide court rejected the landlord's argument that the
tenants could not "bootstrap" themselves into being residents of a
de facto multiple dwelling when their own "unlawful conduct" was
responsible for conferring this designation upon the building. 212 This
argument had been successful in McClelland,2 3 but was rejected here
because of the landlord's concessions, "which effect[ed] a modification of the leases to provide for residential as well as commercial
occupancies. ' 2 4 Finally, the court held that, because the building
was a de facto multiple dwelling, 23 the landlord had to have filed
a multiple dwelling registration statement in order to maintain a
summary proceeding for illegal use, and that the landlord could not
26
collect rent because of the lack of a certificate of occupancy. 1
According to the court, the landlord's only remedy would have been
27
an action in ejectment. 1
Although the Nationwide court rejected a number of arguments
which had enabled the landlord to prevail in McClelland, it may
be the procedural circumstances that explain the different results.
While Nationwide involved a holdover proceeding in which the
landlord sought to remove the tenants, 28 McClelland involved a
nonpayment proceeding. 219 If the landlord had won in Nationwide,
the tenant would have had to vacate the premises. 220 Conversely, in
McClelland, although the landlord prevailed, the tenant could have
must also prove that the violation did not readily lend itself to correction. Id. See
generally RASCH, supra note 165, §§ 1109, 1112 (landlord has burden of proving
that premises are in continuous and permanent illegal use).
212. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 12, col. I.
213. 94 Misc. 2d at 310, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 164.

214. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 12, col. 1.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 12, col. 2. See generally supra note 163-64 (discussion of ejectment).
There are only two published New York cases in which a landlord brought an
ejectment action against loft residents. See Symons v. Nickson, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20,
1982, at 11, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1982); Trans World Maintenance
Serv. v. Rodd, 113 Misc. 2d 201, 448 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
As both cases turned on the application of Chapter 889, see infra notes 330-37
and accompanying text, the courts never discussed the issue of whether ejectment
is an appropriate remedy if a summary proceeding cannot be brought. One attorney
has reported that as of February 1983, dozens of loft ejectment actions were pending
in New York Supreme Court. Remarks of Attorney Alan Liebman at the Forum
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on "Lofts Revisited: Were
the Equities Balanced?" (Feb. 7, 1983).
218. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 11, col. 6.
219. 94 Misc. 2d at 309, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 163.

220. See supra note 187.
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paid the back rent and thus avoided eviction. 22' The Nationwide
court acknowledged this difference, stating that a tenant cannot
avoid a lease merely because the landlord has no certificate of
occupancy, unless the tenant can show that the landlord has placed
the tenant at hazard of his health or safety by the violations of the
MDL. 2 2 "Conversely [,however,] the landlord's failure to comply
with law or to obtain a certificate of occupancy cannot be made
the basis for transforming an 'apparently' legitimate occupancy into
,223
"...
an unlawful one .
Clearly, the court was concerned with the equities of the situation:
neither the landlord nor the tenant should be allowed to abrogate
the implied residential lease purely for his or her own reasons.
Nationwide, then, represented less of a tenants' victory than did
Lipkis I. It represented a third approach, differing from that of
either McClelland or Lipkis I-it rested on the procedural posture
of the landlord's cause of action. The reasoning of Nationwide
seemed to favor a McClelland result in a nonpayment proceeding
and a Lipkis I result in a holdover proceeding. 2 4 Thus, the case
law at this point in its development was thoroughly confused.
221. Id.
222. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 12, col. I (citing Herzog v. Thompson, 50
Misc. 2d 488, 270 N.Y.S.2d 469 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1966)).
223. Id.
224. Ellis v. Cordes, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 1979, at 14, col. 5 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County 1978), is another case supporting the McClelland approach. Here the
landlord brought a nonpayment proceeding. Id. The court found that the building
was not a de facto multiple dwelling. Id. at col. 6. In considering what penalties
might be imposed on the landlord if the building were a multiple dwelling, the
court read section D26-41.21 of the New York City Administrative Code, supra
note 168, uniquely, holding that when a building lacked a certificate of occupancy
or registration number, the court might, at its discretion, allow or not allow a
proceeding to recover rent. Ellis, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 1979, at 14, col. 6 (emphasis
added). It is clear from the Code, however, that section D26-41.21 on its face grants

this discretion only when a registration number is missing. N.Y.

CITY ADMIN. CODE

§ D26-41.21-b (Williams 1977). Moreover, section 302.1.b of the MDL, on its face,
does not allow rent to be collected when a certificate is lacking. N.Y. MULT. DWELL.
LAW § 302.1.a, b (McKinney 1974); see supra note 202.
The court went considerably beyond the factual finding that the building was
not a de facto multiple dwelling. Ellis, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 1979, at 14, col. 5. It
held that even assuming the building was a de facto multiple dwelling for which
the landlord did not have either a certificate of occupancy or a multiple dwelling
registration statement, the tenant must "prove that he was inconvenienced or that
his health and safety were in danger" as a result of the absence of the certificate
or registration before he could raise the lack of the certificate or registration in
the proceeding. Id. at col. 6. In the instant case, the tenant could not raise these
issues because, as in McClelland, the tenant must have known from the terms of
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One possible additional factor, beyond the procedural context,
explaining the diverse case law which had developed by this time
is the different types of tenants involved in each case. While the
courts generally have been more sympathetic to artists living in illegal
lofts, 225 the only court to have explicitly relied on this fact was the
court in Mintz v. Robinson.226 In fact, other courts have even held
227

against artists.
This developing split in authority in the New York Civil Court
22s
was partially resolved by the appellate term in Lipkis v. Pikus
(Lipkis I), which adopted an approach close to that of the Nationwide court by paying particular attention to the equities of the
specific illegal loft situation. 229 The appellate term reversed Lipkis

I in part, directing final judgment for the landlord but ordering the
the lease, which was a commercial loft lease, and from the "surrounding circumstances of the negotiations" that his residency in the loft was at best "questionable."
Id. To allow the tenant to raise these defenses against the landlord, absent any
inconvenience or danger to health and safety would be to allow the tenant to
"unjustly enrich" himself. Id. at 15, col. 6.
225. Whether the tenants in Nationwide were artists is not explicit, but the fact
that they signed leases which allowed them to use the premises for "commercial
art production" suggests that they were. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 11, col. 6.
The occupations of the tenants in Ellis v. Cordes, however, cannot even be inferred.
226. 81 Misc. 2d 447, 448-49, 366 N.Y.S.2d 547, 548-50 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings
County 1975).
227. E.g., Tarkington Assocs. v. Spilner, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1978, at 10, col. 3
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1977).
228. Lipkis v. Pikus, 99 Misc. 2d 518, 416 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st
Dep't 1979), modifying 96 Misc. 2d 581, 409 N.Y.S.2d 598 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1978), aff'd, 72 A.D.2d 697, 421 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dep't 1979), appeal
dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 874, 414 N.E.2d 399, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1980).
229. Id., 99 Misc. 2d at 521, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 697. The importance of the procedural stance of the case, a nonpayment proceeding, in explaining Lipkis H is clear
from two later appellate term decisions, heard by the same panel of judges (only
one of whom was involved in the Lipkis II decision) but reaching two different conclusions. In Krax Pepipatie Apanu Stu Krokodrilos Tus Platos, Ltd. v. Van
Hentenryck, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 1981, at 11, col. I (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't
1981), the landlord brought a holdover proceeding. The landlord was not allowed
to recover possession as he did not allege that the building had a multiple-dwelling
registration number. The appellate term wrote that this rule "refers to every summary proceeding ....

There is no persuasive reason to distinguish between nonpay-

ment and holdover proceedings in this context .... ." Id. (emphasis in original).
The words "in this context" may explain why the same panel, five months later,
came to an opposite conclusion in a nonpayment proceeding. See Mayeri Corp.
v. Starr, N.Y.L.J., June 1, 1981, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1981).
The lower court had dismissed the nonpayment proceedings because the owner had
not proven that the buildings were not subject to rent control, rent stabilization,
or the Emergency Tenant Protection Act. Id. The appellate term wrote that "[a]lthough
a residential certificate of occupancy has yet to be obtained, if it should be determined
after a hearing of tenants' defenses that petitioner is entitled to a final judgment,
a final judgment should be entered pursuant to Lipkis v. Pikus." Id. (citation
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tenants to pay their back and future rent to the clerk of the civil
court. 230 Enforcement of the judgment, however, was stayed until
the landlord obtained a certificate of occupancy.23 ' Upon obtaining
it, the landlord could move to vacate the stay and to receive the
232
escrowed rent fund.
Significantly, the appellate term upheld the trial court's approach
to determining what constituted a de facto multiple dwelling.233 The
omitted). The appellate term in these two cases had not allowed landlords of
buildings without certificates of occupancy and registration numbers to bring successful holdover proceedings, but it had allowed them to bring partially successful
nonpayment proceedings. But cf. Gordon & Gordon v. Carvajal, N.Y.L.J., Feb.
8, 1980, at 6, col. 6 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980) (in nonpayment proceeding
where landlord did not give "active encouragement" to conversion, held that there
was no de facto multiple dwelling and landlord was granted possession).
The Krax court's conclusion that there is "no persuasive reason to distinguish
between nonpayment and holdover proceedings," Krax, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 1981,
at 11, col. I, is not at all clear from reading the MDL itself. Sections 302 and 325
prevent the landlord from recovering rent when the building does not have a residential
certificate of occupancy, N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302.1.b (McKinney 1974), and

when the building does not meet local registration requirements. N.Y.

MULT. DWELL.

§ 325.2 (McKinney 1974). Neither section by its language, restricts holdover
as opposed to nonpayment proceedings.
The local registration requirements in New York City prevent the landlord from
recovering possession for nonpayment of rent when the building does not have a
LAW

registration statement on file. N.Y.

CITY ADMIN.

CODE

§ D26-41.21.b (Williams

1977). Section D26-41.21.b goes on to state that "[in any action to recover possession
under section 711 of the real property actions and proceedings law, the owner shall

set forth his registration number issued by the department, and shall allege that
he has filed a statement of registration. . . ." Id. If this sentence is read in
conjunction with the sentence on recovering possession for nonpayment of rent,
then holdover proceedings also would not be covered by section D26-41.21.b.
The final authority cited by the courts in summary proceedings cases is the Rules
of Practice of the New York City Civil Court. The Rules require that in "every
summary proceeding," the petitioner must allege either that the building is not a
multiple dwelling or that the building has a "currently effective registration statement
on file." N.Y. CITY CIv. CT. Pa.Ac. R. § 2900.21(f) (superseded and recodified
at McKinney's 1986 New York Rules of Court § 208.42(g) (22 NYCRR § 208.42(g)).
It is not clear why the courts have construed the Administrative Code to cover
all summary proceedings, and not just nonpayment proceedings, when section D2641.21.b seems to address only repayment proceedings. See, e.g., Krax Pepipatie
Apanu Stu Krokodrilos Tus Platos, Ltd. v. Van Hentenryck, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22,
1981, at II, col. I (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1981). Justice Sandier, dissenting
in Corris v. 129 Front Co., 85 A.D.2d 176, 447 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1st Dep't 1982),
recognized that the MDL and the Administrative Code provide "separate legal
impediment[s]" to a landlord's recovery of rent. Id. at 183, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
Justice Sandier, however, did not discuss the holdover versus non-payment proceedings issue.
230. 99 Misc. 2d at 519, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 520, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 696; accord Mandel v. Pitkowsky, 102 Misc.
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appellate term, however, was unwilling to give the tenants a windfall
of rent-free occupancy by holding that the MDL prevented the
landlord from collecting rent.23 4 The court reasoned that although
the landlord "was aware of and directly encouraged the conversions
... tenants knew, or should have known, by the very terms of
their leases as well as the surrounding conditions, that their occupancy
was illegal.' '235 The court reasoned further that these types of conversions were occurring "wholesale," and that the MDL had not
been intended to deal with such widespread, illegal conversion. 23 6
To avoid the inequitable result of giving the tenants occupancy rentfree,237 the court created its unique ruling which required the tenants
to pay rent to the civil court until the landlord obtained a certificate
of occupancy.. This forced the tenants to pay rent and it also
encouraged the landlord to bring the building up to MDL standards. 238

2d 478, 479, 425 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1979), aff'd
mem., 76 A.D.2d 807, 429 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1980).
234. 99 Misc. 2d at 520, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 520-21, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
237. Id. at 520, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 696. Unrebutted testimony that the buildings
"substantially complied with many of the minimum standards" of the MDL and
that there was no proof that the premises were "a threat to the health and/or
safety of the tenants" weighed heavily with the appellate term. Id. at 520, 416
N.Y.S.2d at 696; accord Ellis v. Cordes, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 1979, at 14, col. 5
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1978); McClelland v. Robinson, 94 Misc. 2d 308,
405 N.Y.S.2d 163 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1978). Judge Cohen, in the civil
court, had rejected the landlord's arguments about substantial compliance with the
MDL, holding that the MDL is a punitive statute in this regard, meant to prevent
a landlord from renting illegal residences. Lipkis I, 96 Misc. 2d at 593, 409 N.Y.S.2d
at 605. Judge Riccobono of the appellate term, dissenting, agreed with Judge Cohen
that the statute should be read literally, and that the landlord should not be able
to collect rent until he had a residential certificate of occupancy for his buildings.
Lipkis II, 99 Misc. 2d at 521, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (Riccobono, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 519, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 695. Lipkis v. Pikus returned to the Appellate
Term at the beginning of 1982. Lipkis v. Pikus, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1982, at 11,
col. I (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1982). The court found that the tenants were
not paying their rent to the civil court, as the appellate term had ordered. Id.
Further, the landlord had been unable to get a residential certificate of occupancy,
but this failure was caused partially by the refusal of the tenants to allow the
landlord access to the premises. Id. Stressing the defaults in payment, the court
held that the landlord could enforce the "possessory judgments" that the appellate
term had granted in 1979. Id. The judgments were entered and a warrant of eviction
issued on January 22, 1982. Lipkis v. Pikus, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1982, at 6, col.
4 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1982). A series of appeals ensued and on August
16, 1982 the civil court by ex parte order stayed the execution of the warrant
pending an examination of the applicability of the newly passed article 7-C. Id.
The appellate term held that the judgment became final before article 7-C was
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Lipkis II, although requiring tenants to pay rent when their buildings did not have residential certificates of occupancy, represented
a considerable advance in legal protection for tenants by upholding
the doctrine of the de facto multiple dwelling.23 9 It not only induced
landlords to bring their buildings up to MDL standards, m but it
implicitly recognized that tenants in buildings that met the requirements of a de facto multiple dwelling were residential tenants with
certain rights. Some of these rights have been spelled out in later
cases.
1. Landlord's Knowledge and Encouragement

In Lipkis II, the appellate term focused on the landlord's role in
the conversion process, and supported the trial court's finding that

the landlord "was aware of and directly encouraged the conversions." 24 Looking to the landlord's knowledge and encouragement
as the two crucial elements for evaluating his role, the court left
open the questions of what constitutes "encouragement" and whether
knowledge alone, without encouragement, was sufficient to hold that
a building is a de facto multiple dwelling.
passed and that, even if the judgment had not been final, "there is nothing in
the new loft law which now affords relief to the tenants in these adjudicated
proceedings." Id.
239. The civil court has taken several approaches to keeping the Lipkis I protenant approach alive, in evident disregard of Lipkis I. See infra notes 260-64
and accompanying text.
240. The published cases have not involved section 302-a of the MDL, which
is a puzzling fact. In brief, section 302-a provides that a tenant in any action to
recover rent or to regain possession for nonpayment may raise, as a defense, that
the building has a "rent impairing" violation. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302a.3.c (McKinney 1974). "Rent impairing" violations are defined as conditions that
the Housing and Development Administration, Office of Code Enforcement, believes
constitute "a fire hazard or a serious threat to the life, health or safety of occupants
thereof." Id. § 302-a.2.a. In some cases the tenant could not raise the "rent
impairing" violation defense because he himself had "caused the violation." Id.
§ 302-a.3.e. But some "rent impairing" violations, such as the lack of a sprinkler
system or a legal second fire egress, are outside the control of any single tenant.
See generally RASCH, supra note 165, § 1320 (reprinting the list of conditions
that the Housing and Development Administration, Office of Code Enforcement
considers to be rent impairing).
A finding that a building is a "fire hazard or in a continued dangerous condition
or detrimental to life or health" also would cause the building to be subject to
rent control. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE Y51-3.0.e.l(b) (Williams 1975 & Supp. 198586). This statutory argument could provide an alternative ground for residential
loft tenants not covered by article 7-C, see infra note 422 and accompanying text,
to seek statutory protection for their tenancies and statutory regulation of their
rents. See infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text (rent control).
241. 99 Misc. 2d at 520, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
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Gordon & Gordon v. Carvajal242 presents the most restrictive
interpretation of "encouragement" in a published opinion to date.
The Carvajal court held that "absent some active participation by
the landlord and encouragement to the tenant to convert, it is ruled
that mere 'knowledge' that a tenant has converted a loft to residential
use leaves too broad a range of speculation unresolved. ' 243 Although
the landlord's managing agent came to the loft several times during
its residential conversion, and despite the landlord's lack of protest,
the landlord's actions did not, according to Carvajal, constitute
evidence of actual encouragement of the conversion. 2" The tenant
was an artist and "[a]n artists [sic] studio may be expected to look
less like a commercial and industrial operation than, say, a shop
where machines are operated. ' 245 Nor was the use by the tenant of
the landlord's plumber to install a kitchen and bathroom sufficient
evidence of encouragement of residential conversion. 246 The court
reasoned that the lease required the tenant to make minor repairs,
which the landlord could have believed his plumber was doing. 247
The landlord's mere knowledge of the conversion was insufficient
to cause the buildings to be designated de facto multiple dwellings.
The tenant had "filled one courtroom bench with prospective witnesses" (these witnesses were other tenants) who could testify that
the landlord was "well aware of" the residential conversions in his
building, 24 s and produced a Buildings Department inspector to verify
that the conversions had occurred. 249 Nevertheless, the court found
this evidence useless unless the plaintiff tenant could also show that
the landlord had "actively participated in altering, transforming the
' 250
lofts as a residential conversion.
Under this decision, a landlord could attempt to avoid the restrictions of the de facto multiple dwelling doctrine by avoiding any
overt act of encouragement. In this way, the landlord could maintain
more control over the loft building, while having 25full knowledge
that the building would be converted to residences.

242. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 1980, at 6, col. 6 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
243. Id. at 7, cols. 1-2.
244. Id. at 7, col. 1.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.at 6, col. 6; id.at 7, col. 1.
248. Id.at 7, col. I.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. The breadth of a landlord's potential power is particularly startling in
Carvajal, because the tenant signed his first lease in 1973 and the nonpayment
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In Gordon & Gordon v. Mandavin, Ltd. 252 a case involving the

same landlord a year later, the appellate term took a more liberal
view of what constitutes encouragement and knowledge on the landlord's part, holding that "[t]he owner's position that changes of
this magnitude were accomplished surreptitiously, and that its agents
were not apprised that families were openly living in this building
for a period of years, is untenable and scarcely believable." ' 253 The
only evidence of the landlord's encouragement mentioned by the

court was that some tenants obtained "rent concessions" to be used
for buying hot water heaters and for other "conversion expenses,"
and that the tenants had testified that the landlord had assured all
of them that they could reside in their lofts even though they had

commercial leases. 254
Although there was more evidence of encouragement in Mandavin
than was offered in Carvajal, the evidence was still minimal. 2"5 The
Mandavin court stressed the "knowledge

landlord, rather than his

encouragement. 2 6

and approval"

of the

The court held that the

landlord cannot bring a holdover proceeding years after the con-

version "when all concerned necessarily knew from the inception of
these leases that the premises would be" residentially occupied. 257

proceeding was not commenced until sometime after July 1, 1979. Id. at 6, col.
6; id. at 7, col. 2. The court held that as this was not a de facto multiple dwelling, the
tenant would have no defenses against a holdover proceeding when his lease expired.
Id. at 7. A landlord, by this court's reasoning, may thus ignore an illegal use for
six years, then successfully institute a holdover proceeding, and win.
252. Gordon & Gordon v. Madavin, Ltd., 108 Misc. 2d 349, 441 N.Y.S.2d 148
(Sup. Ct. App. T. Ist Dep't 1981).
253. Id. at 350, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 150 (emphasis added). The landlord based his
argument on 155 Wooster Assocs. v. Bengis, N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1979, at 12, col.
I (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1979), where the court distinguished its finding in
Tarkington Assocs. v. Spilner, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1978, at 10, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.
App. T. 1st Dep't 1978), that the landlord had not given his consent to the
conversion. 155 Wooster St. Assocs., N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1979, at 12, col. 2. In 155
Wooster St. Assocs., two of the landlord's partners lived in the building and a third
had a studio there, so that the argument based on surreptitiousness was of no avail
to the landlord. By placing so much stress on the "knowledge" component of the
test, rather than on "encouragement," and by holding that Tarkington Assocs.
"should be limited strictly to its facts" of surreptitious converions, id., the appellate
term in 155 Wooster St. Assocs. also foreshadowed its eventual approach in Madavin.
See supra note 252 and infra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
254. 108 Misc. 2d at 350, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
255. After all, the installation of a hot water heater and other conversions carried
out in Madavin could have been, as the court in Carvajal reasoned, to improve
a commercial space as well as a residential space. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 1980, at 7,
col. 1.
256. 108 Misc. 2d at 350, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
257. Id. (emphasis added). In Madavin, the landlord had instituted a holdover
proceeding while the tenants' leases were still in force. Id. at 349, 351, 441 N.Y.S.2d
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Warranty of Habitability

Lipkis I ' 8 held that the statutorily implied warranty of habitability
applied to de facto multiple dwellings. 25 9 This issue has arisen in
two other civil court cases, but it has never been considered by a

higher New York court. The result of one case favored tenants,
while the result of the other favored landlords.
Lipkis v. Silleck,260 the first case, used the warranty of habitability
to circumvent the holding of Lipkis IP 6 1-that the tenants were
required to continue paying their rent by depositing it with the civil
court until the landlord obtained a residential certificate of occupancy. 262 In this case, the landlord brought a nonpayment proceeding
at 149, 150. Carvajal involved a nonpayment proceeding, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 1980,
at 6, col. 6, but the Carvajal court held that its reasoning would also apply to a
holdover proceeding for an expired lease. Id. at 7, col. 2. Although the Carvajal
reasoning should also logically apply to holdover proceedings alleging illegal uses,
the Carvajal court could have dealt differently with such a situation. See generally
supra notes 188, 224 & 229.
The Madavin court was also influenced by Chapter 889, see infra notes 331-37
and accompanying text, and observed that such remedial legislation was not meant
to operate wholly prospectively. 108 Misc. 2d at 351, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 150. The
Madavin court went on to hold that even assuming arguendo that the Loft Protection
Act "is not appropriately applied here, we would reverse the final judgments and
dismiss the petitions for the reasons earlier stated in this decision. By so holding,
we decide these cases in a manner consistent with what is now the expressed public
policy of this State." 108 Misc. 2d at 352, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
On the related question of whether an owner who buys a building that had been
converted to residential use prior to his ownership may bring a holdover proceeding,
the appellate term has held that he may not. Sixty-four Fulton St. Assocs. v.
Dwyer, N.Y.L.J., May 21, 1981, at 7, col. I (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1980).
Even though the new landlord brought these proceedings within three months of
taking title, arguing that it "had not been a party to the conversion process," the
landlord was held to have taken title "subject to the character of the tenancies
necessarily known to it and subject to rights existing in the tenants." Id. at cols.
1-2.
258. Lipkis v. Pikus, 96 Misc. 2d 581, 409 N.Y.S.2d 598 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1978), modified, 99 Misc. 2d 518, 416 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. App. T.
1st Dep't), aff'd, 72 A.D.2d 697, 421 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dep't 1979), appeal
dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 874, 414 N.E.2d 399, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1980).
259. See supra note 203.
260. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 1979, at 7, col. 3 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
261. Lipkus v. Pikus, 99 Misc. 2d 518, 416 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. App. T.
1st Dep't), aff'd, 72 A.D.2d 697, 421 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dep't 1979), appeal
dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 874, 414 N.E.2d 399, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1980).
262. Id. at 519, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 695. Laight Coop. Corp. v. Kenny, 105 Misc.
2d 1001, 430 N.Y.S.2d 237 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980), is another example
of an imaginative end run around Lipkis 1I. Laight involved a nonpayment proceeding. Judge Freedman relied on Mandel v. Pitkowsky, 102 Misc. 2d 478, 425
N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1979), aff'd mem., 76 A.D.2d 807, 429
N.Y.S.2d 550 (lst Dep't 1980), citing it for the proposition that a landlord cannot maintain
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against the tenants. The court, after endorsing the reasoning of
Lipkis I which did not allow the landlord to collect any rent, and
after stating that were it not "constrained" by Lipkis II, it would
not have allowed the landlord to collect any rent, 263 then turned to
the warranty of habitability issue. The court held that the warranty
applied to a de facto multiple dwelling and that the landlord had
breached the warranty. 2" While the total amount of overdue rent
was $3150, the court held the tenant was due $2955 for his counterclaim on the warranty and, therefore, the tenant was required to
pay only $195 .265 The court thus forgave the tenant almost ninetyfour percent of his overdue rent. The formula used by the court
presumably would have continued to apply until the landlord began
to provide the necessary services and to repair the damage to the
building's roof, as legally required of the owners of multiple dwellings.
In practical terms, the Silleck court brought about the same result
as the Lipkis I court. In Lipkis I, the landlord could collect no
rent, while in Silleck, he could collect only negligible rent. In both
cases, the landlord's ability to collect the full amount of the rent
was contingent on his bringing the building into compliance with
the Multiple Dwelling Law.
In Lipkis v. Krugman,2 6 a case involving the same building as
did Silleck, the court interpreted the Real Property Law as restricting
the application of the warranty of habitability. The court noted that
section 235-b,2 61 which provides for the warranty, had not become
a summary proceeding without a multiple dwelling registration number. 105 Misc.
2d at 1002, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 238. Judge Freedman ignored the fact that Mandel
arose as a holdover proceeding case. Mandel, 102 Misc. 2d at 479, 425 N.Y.S.2d
at 927. She also ignored the appellate term's requirement in Lipkis I that the
tenants pay rent to the civil court, 99 Misc. 2d at 519, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 695, even
though at least one building in Lipkis H1, 47 Walker Street, did not have a registration
number. See id. at 519-20, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 696. By reading Mandel literally and
without considering its procedural context, and ignoring the Lipkis If decision,
Judge Freedman was able to reach a result very similar to that of Lipkis 1: the
tenants were relieved completely from rent obligations, at least until the landlord
obtained a registration number. Laight, 105 Misc. 2d at 1004, 430 N.Y.S.2d at
239.
It should be noted that Laight also stands for the proposition that a cooperative's
board of directors is to be treated the same as any other landlord when judging
whether it can bring a summary proceeding and whether the warranty of habitability
applies. 105 Misc. 2d at 1003, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
263. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 1979, at 7, col. 4.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 111 Misc. 2d 445, 444 N.Y.S.2d 342 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1981).
267. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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effective until August 1, 1975. Since the leases in question were

signed before this date, the tenants did not have the statutorily
implied warranty of habitability. 26 Even under the Krugman ap-

proach, however, the warranty is available to tenants under leases
signed after August 1, 1975. As a result, a cause of action for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability in de facto multiple
dwellings, at this point, seems to be firmly established.
3. The Effect of Subsequent Vacancies upon a Prior
Determination of De Facto Multiple Dwelling Status
One issue on which there is a split in the lower New York courts
"is whether a building previously found to be a de facto multiple

dwelling continues as such even if subsequently one or more units

2' 69
are vacated, leaving fewer than three residential units remaining.
In Mintz v. Banks,270 a nonpayment proceeding involving a building
with two resident artists and a vacant loft that had previously been

used as a residence, the appellate term held that "[s]ince the vacant
loft can and may be used for commercial rather than residential
purposes, the premises do not come within the definition of multiple
dwelling. '27 1 Ropla Realty Corp. v. Ulmer, however, explicitly rejected Mintz. 272 The Ropla court held that a landlord cannot alter
268. Krugman, 11l Misc. 2d at 447-48, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 344. One interesting
fact about this holding is that although the same building, 71-73 Franklin Street,
was involved in both cases, Judge Nason does not comment on Judge Cahn's
ruling on the issue of the warranty of habitability in Silleck. The two cases can
be reconciled on the grounds that in Krugman, the case against the tenant Silleck,
who had been the only defendant in Silleck, and three of the other four tenants,
was dismissed because of a deficiency in the landlord's pleading. Id. at 446, 444
N.Y.S.2d at 344. Thus, Judge Nason's holding, although in apparent conflict with
Judge Cahn on the warranty of habitability, had the same practical effect for
Silleck-Silleck remained in possession of his dwelling unit.
In addition, the cases may be reconcilable on the facts of Silleck's lease. Silleck
appears to have signed his lease in August 1975. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 1979, at 7,
col. 3. As this is only an allegation in the complaint, it is not entirely clear that
it is true. But if the date is correct, then both judges could, consistently with their
own rationales, have found Silleck's lease to contain an implied warranty of
habitability.
269. Ropla Realty Corp. v. Ulmer, 110 Misc. 2d 619, 620, 442 N.Y.S.2d 889,
890 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (emphasis omitted).
270. N.Y.L.J:, April 19, 1976, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't).
271. Id. The Mintz opinion had not made clear that the vacant loft had been
residentially occupied. The Ropla opinion, however, clarifies this; in fact, the vacant
loft was a registered AIR loft. 110 Misc. 2d at 621, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
272. 110 Misc. 2d at 621, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 891 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1981).
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the de facto multiple dwelling status of a building "by simply refusing
' 273
to rent vacant loft space.
B.

"De Facto" Rent Stabilization
The finding that a building is a de facto multiple dwelling does

not fully protect a tenant when his lease expires. Unless the tenant
is covered by the Rent Control2 74 or Rent Stabilization Laws, 275 a

New York City landlord has complete discretion as to whether to
offer the tenant a new lease. 276 Furthermore, the landlord may impose
any level of rent increase. 277 In addition, the landlord may bring a
summary proceeding against a holdover tenant, a proceeding which
would not necessarily be deterred by sections 302 and 325 of the
MDL.1 71 Conversely, a tenant protected by the Rent Control or Rent

273. Id. at 622, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 891; accord Gilbert v. Roel Realty Co., N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 27, 1982, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). The Ropla court was influenced
by the "suspicion" that the landlord would rerent the loft dwelling unit, presumably
for higher rents. 110 Misc. 2d at 622, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 891. The differing results
may be partially explained by the the more hesitant protection the courts have
offered tenants in nonpayment proceedings (Mintz) as compared to holdover proceedings (Ropla). See supra notes 188, 224 & 229.
274. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ Y51-1.0 to -17.0 (Williams 1975 & Supp. 198586). See generally N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8605, 8606 (McKinney 1974 & Supp.
1986) (granting New York City authority to pass local rent control laws).

275. N.Y.

CITY ADMIN. CODE

§§ YY51-1.0 to -8.0 (Williams 1975 & Supp. 1985-

86). See generally 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 135, 261 N.E.2d
647, 653, 313 N.Y.S.2d 733, 741 (1970) (rent stabilization law does not violate
specific statutory authority for local rent control laws).
276. 33 N.Y. JUR. Landlord & Tenant § 14 (1964).
277. 34 N.Y. JUR. Landlord & Tenant § 283 (1964).
278. "A special proceeding may be maintained under this article upon the following grounds: 1. The tenant continues in possession of any portion of the premises

after the expiration of his term .....

N.Y.

REAL PROP.

ACTS.

LAW

§ 711.1

(McKinney 1979).
Sections 302 and 325 of the MDL only prohibit a landlord whose building lacks
a residential certificate of occupancy and registration statement from bringing a

nonpayment proceeding. N.Y.

MULT. DWELL.

LAW

§§ 302.1.b, 325.2 (McKinney

1974 & Supp. 1986). These two sections, 302.1.b and 325.2, do not address section
711 summary proceedings in general. Section D26-41.21(b) also prevents landlords
who fail to file a certificate of registration from collecting rent. N.Y. CITY ADMIN.
CODE § D26-41.21(b) (Williams 1977). Section 2900.21(0 of the New York Civil
Court Rules does not cover holdover proceedings, since it was issued to implement
section 325 of the MDL. N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. PRAC. R. § 2900.21(f) (superseded
and recodified at McKinney's 1986 New York Rules of Court § 208.42(g) (22
NYCRR § 208.42(g)).
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Stabilization Laws is entitled to a lease renewal 2" at an increase set
by a government agency. 80
Residential loft buildings are not covered by the Rent Control Law

because "[hiousing accommodations created by a change from a
non-housing use to a housing use" after 1947 generally are not

covered by the Rent Control Law. 8 ' The Emergency Tenant Protection
Act, 2812 however, allows "each city, town or village" within certain
areas of New York State, including New York City, to determine

whether there exists a local "public emergency requiring the regulation of residential rents for all or any class or classes of housing
accommodations" whose rents were not already regulated.283 Pursuant
to this authority, the New York City Council declared an emergency
covering all classes of housing eligible under the Emergency Tenant
Protection Act for regulation but not excluding any classes. 284
The Rent Stabilization Law, a local New York City law, 285 has
incorporated, since 1974, the declaration of public emergency required
by the Emergency Tenant Protection Act. 28 6 The Rent Stabilization

Law, unlike the Rent Control Law, can cover residential loft buildings
with six or more units. The Rent Stabilization Law applies "to class
A multiple dwellings not owned as a cooperative or as a condominium, containing six or more dwelling units," 28 ' if the dwelling units
were completed after February 1, 194788 or have been removed from

rent control.289
Mandel v. Pitkowsk
279. N.Y. CITY
CITY ADMIN.

29 °

extended the Rent Stabilization Law to

§

ADMIN. CODE
Y51-6.0 (Williams 1975 & Supp.
CODE
YY51-6.0 (Williams 1975 & Supp. 1985-86).
CITY ADMIN. CODE
Y51-5.0, YY51-5.0 (Williams

§

1985-86); N.Y.

280. N.Y.
§§
1975 & Supp.
1985-86).
281. Id.; § Y51-3.0.e.2(i)(l).
282. See supra note 281; N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8621-34 (McKinney 1974 &
Supp. 1986).
283. See supra note 282; N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8623a, 8634 (McKinney 1974
& Supp. 1986).
284. See supra note 283; N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ YY5I-1.0 to -1.0.1 (Williams
1975 & Supp. 1985-86).
285. See supra note 284; N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § YYSI-I.0 (Williams 1975
& Supp. 1985-86).
286. See supra note 285.
287. Id.; N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § YY51-3.0 (Williams 1975 & Supp. 198586). "A 'class A' multiple dwelling is a multiple dwelling which is occupied, as a
rule, for permanent residence purposes." N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4.8.a (McKinney
1974).
288. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § YY51-3.0.a (Williams 1975 & Supp. 1985-86).
289. Id. § YY5I-3.0.a.(2).
290. 102 Misc. 2d 478, 425 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1979),
aff'd mem., 76 A.D.2d 807, 429 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1981). This was a holdover
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cover de facto multiple dwellings. 2 91 The number of tenants in the
building involved in Mandel is unclear from the facts-there were
at least four, and possibly six. 2 92 Without discussing the exact number
of tenants, the appellate term held that the enactment of the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974 had brought de facto multiple
dwellings under the Rent Stabilization Law. 293 A year later, in Poutinen v. Civello29 the same court explicitly limited the holding of
Mandel to situations where the building has six or more dwelling
units .295

Unlike the well-litigated territory of de facto multiple dwellings,
the issue of de facto rent stabilization is just emerging. It is a crucial
issue for loft residents because they are affected by the rising popularity of lofts as residences and as offices. 29 The Poutinen approach
creates a problem for many of these loft residents because they do
not live in buildings with six or more residences. 297 It is quite possible
summary proceeding brought by the landlord to evict tenants whose commercial leases
had expired. The tenants had "balked" at paying 30007o rent increases. 102 Misc.
2d at 479, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 927. The tenants had "invested substantial sums" in
converting their lofts for living and had occupied these lofts for twelve years. Id.
at 479, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
291. Id. at 479, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
292. Id. at 479, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 926 (list of defendants).
293. Id. at 480, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 928. This "holding" was technically dictum,
as the court itself pointed out, because the landlord's petition would have been
dismissed anyway for lack of a multiple dwelling registration number. Id. In reaching
its conclusion on the applicability of rent stabilization, the court emphasized the
long duration-12 years-of the tenants' residence. Id. The protection afforded
tenants by the Emergency Tenant Protection Act, however, does not relieve them
of the obligation to pay rent. See id. at 481, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 928; accord Mayeri
Corp., N.Y.L.J., June 1, 1981, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't).
294. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1980, at 7, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1980).
The loft tenant's lease had expired and he was thus a month-to-month tenant. Id.
He then entered into an agreement with the landlord to terminate the landlord
and tenant relationship. Id. The tenant raised a number of contractual defenses
to the agreement, all of which the Poutinen court rejected. Id. at cols. 3-4.
295. Id. There were at least three tenants involved in this case, as three actions
were decided at the same time. Id. The tenant had argued that there was a lack
of consideration for the agreement to terminate his tenancy. But the court held
that there was no need for consideration as he was only a month-to-month tenant
and he was not covered by rent stabilization, with its statutory guarantee of lease
renewal. Id. The court cited section 8625.a.(4)(a) of the Emergency Tenant Protection
Act to support its holding. Id. Section 8625.a.(4)(a) provides that a declaration of
emergency may not be made concerning "housing accomodations in a building
containing fewer than six dwelling units .... " N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8625.a.(4)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1986).
296. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
297.
YORK,
YORK

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND
RESIDENTIAL STATUS

5 (1981)

DEVELOPMENT,

CITY OF NEW

LEGISLATION FOR LOFT HOUSING IN THE CITY OF NEW

[hereinafter cited as LoFT HOUSING]. A further limitation on the

608
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that residents of illegal lofts will be deprived of their homes at the
expiration of their leases, even after they have spent substantial
sums of money converting the spaces to residences or compensating
the previous tenants for their expenditures,29 and even where the
conversions or payments were made with the landlord's knowledge
and encouragement. 29
In construing the MDL and the Rent Stabilization Law, the courts
have looked to the explicit requirements of the statutes themselves
to fix the number of independent families or residential dwelling
units necessary to invoke the de facto multiple dwelling 3°° or rent
stabilization doctrines.3 0' There is apparently no way to construe the
Rent Stabilization Law as covering buildings with fewer than six
units.3°2 To extend the protection of rent stabilization to tenants in

de facto rent stabilization doctrine was developed in Lipkis v. Krugman, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 26, 1981, at 11, col. 6 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County). Here the court held
that "the creation of a residential unit out of a unit previously used solely for
commercial purposes constitutes a substantial rehabilitation of the space in question"
and that if such rehabilitation is carried out after January 1, 1974, "such unit is
not subject to the rent stabilization law." Id.. The court arrived at this conclusion
by examining section 8625.a.(5) of the Emergency Tenant Protection Act, which
excludes from its coverage "housing accomodations in . . . buildings substantially
rehabilitated as family units on or after January first, nineteen hundred and seventyfour." Id. As the Emergency Tenant Protection Act had been the grounds upon
which the Mandel court relied in bringing that particular de facto multiple dwelling
under rent stabilization, 102 Misc. 2d at 480, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 928, the Krugman
court's interpretation of the statute is an important issue for future resolution.
On the facts, Mandel and Krugman are not in conflict, since the tenants in
Mandel had occupied their premises as residences since at least 1968. Id. Moreover,
the Mandel court stressed this lengthy residence in writing its opinion. Id. This
emphasis on the length of residence, plus the clear support in the language of the
Emergency Tenant Protection Act for the Krugman court's holding and the requirement that buildings contain six or more dwelling units to be covered, as held
in Poutinen, see supra note 295, may well make the de facto rent stabilization
doctrine of minimal usefulness to many illegal loft tenants.
298. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
299. The Poutinen opinion did not suggest that any evidence concerning the
tenant's expenditures had been considered. Moreover, although the procedure in
the civil court below is not clearly explained, the landlord, evidently, had brought
a holdover proceeding against the tenant. The tenant and landlord then signed a
settlement agreement to terminate the lease and, before signing, one of the landlords
advised the tenant, in writing, to seek legal counsel if he had any questions.
Poutinen v. Civello, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1980, at 7, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st
Dep't 1980). Here, the landlord acted in good faith toward his tenant; this will
not always be the situation in the future. One can only wonder what the result
in the case would have been had the tenant expended much time or money in
conversion or had the landlord not acted in good faith.
300. See supra notes 164-240 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 275-99 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 292-95 and accompanying text.
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buildings with fewer than six units, the courts would have had to
create a common law doctrine, rather than relying on existing statutes.
Although there is no direct evidence of thought processes of the
New York's courts, it is not difficult to understand thpir hesitancy
in moving quickly and radically on such complicated issues. 03
The state legislature, however, took this burden from the courts
by enacting article 7-C of the Multiple Dwelling Law. Rent stabilization was thereby extended to cover converted loft buildings with
three or more dwelling units.3°4 The state legislature thus extended
the pioneering innovations of the courts.
C.

Corris

In Corris v. 129 Front Co.,3°5 the appellate division issued an
opinion whose importance ranks with Lipkis 11 and Mandel. The
Corris court, in dictum, suggests a "more flexible view" regarding
the principles of Lipkis 11 and Mandel.3 This suggestion has begun
to influence the lower courts to reach decisions which are less pro-

tenant. 310
The tenants in Corris withheld their rent, which led the landlord

of the de facto multiple dwelling to limit the provision of services 0
to those provided for in the lease-"essentially limiting his obligation
to furnish heat, hot water and elevator services only to business
hours."' 9 The supreme court had granted the tenants an injunction
directing the landlord to provide services; simultaneously, the supreme
court directed the tenants to pay all rent due. 10° The appellate division
affirmed the supreme court order insofar as the grant of the in-

junction directing the landlord to provide services; but the appellate
division modified the order by making the payment of rent by the

tenant a condition of enforcing the injunction.3"' The effect of this
holding was to overrule Lipkis II, at least in the context of an

303. See generally Corris v. 129 Front Co., 85 A.D.2d 176, 184, 447 N.Y.S.2d
480, 485 (1st Dep't 1982) (Sandier, J., dissenting in part) (describing "perplexing"
legal problems involving illegal lofts).
304. See infra notes 386, 395 and accompanying text.
305. 85 A.D.2d 176, 447 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1st Dep't 1982).
306. Id. at 179; 447 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
307. E.g., Lipkis v. Pikus, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1982, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 1st Dep't 1982); Eli Haddad Corp. v. Coco, N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1982, at 11,

col. 1 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
308. 85 A.D.2d at 181-82, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 484 (Sandier, J., dissenting in part).
309. Id. at 177, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
310. Id. at 176-77, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
311. Id. at 178, 180, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
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action in equity: although he "candidly acknowledged" that he had
no certificate of occupancy and that he had not filed the multiple
dwelling registration statement required by the New York City Administrative Code, 1 2 the landlord in Corris nevertheless was allowed
to collect rent directly.
Justice Sandier wrote a well-reasoned separate opinion in Corris
in which he concurred in part and dissented in part." 3 He pointed
out that the majority decision in effect held "out an inducement
to landlords to violate the law.1 31 4 If the landlord had brought a
nonpayment proceeding, he could not have directly received rent
under Lipkis II and Mandel; but if the landlord withheld legally
mandated services and drove the tenants to seek an injunction, then
he could directly receive rent as a precondition to the equitable
enforcement of his obligations to provide residential services. 3" Justice Sandier agreed with the majority that the landlord was entitled
to current rent, 31 6 but argued that "it is necessary to modify that
aspect of the Lipkis and Mandel rule that denies such landlords [as
the defendant in Corris] the right actually to receive rents in [Real
711 proceedings until they
Property Actions & Proceedings Law]
31 7
occupancy.
of
secure a certificate
Justice Sandler's dissent focused on the fact that just as the lack
of a certificate of occupancy should not be a block to recovering
rent, neither should the lack of a registration statement.3 " Ultimately,
however, Justice Sandler's position was no clearer than that of the
majority. Pleading a lack of information on the "complicated social
and economic problems presented," Justice Sandler wrote:
In the present state of judicial knowledge, and subject to the
enlightenment that may be provided by future cases, I am inclined
to favor a more flexible approach that would vest trial courts with
the discretionary power, depending on the balance of factors
presented in individual cases, to pursue varying approaches. 3"'
He thus advocated removing any of the rules established by previous
cases because, "[i]f there are presently apparent general principles
that would yield on a consistent basis wholly satisfactory responses

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
Id. at
Id. at

181, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
181, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
182, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
181-82, 447 N.Y.S.2d
181, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
182, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
183, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
182, 447 N.Y.S.2d at

484.
483.
484 (Sandier, J., dissenting in
at 484 (Sandier, J., dissenting
483 (Sandier, J., dissenting in
484 (Sandier, J., dissenting in
485 (Sandier, J., dissenting in
484 (Sandier, J., dissenting in

part).
in part).
part).
part).
part).
part).
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to these problems, I am not aware of them." 320 At least one court
has used Corris as authority in rendering a pro-landlord decision.
In Eli Haddad Corp. v. Coco, 3 2 1 a nonpayment proceeding, Judge
Lane found that the landlord had not carried his burden of proving
that the building was not a de facto multiple dwelling and that
"[a]ccordingly pursuant to statutory and decisional law, the petition
should be dismissed or, even if granted, enforcement should be
stayed.' '322 However, Judge Lane used Corris as authority for granting final judgment for possession in spite of the "statutory and
3 23
decisional law" he had cited.
D.

The Future Direction of the Case Law

Corris apparently has established that "a landlord and a tenant
have reciprocal obligations, the landlord to furnish space and services,
the tenant to pay rent. Tenants in converted premises should obvciously have essential services. On the other hand, it is economically
impossible for landlords to continue to render such services indefinitely without receiving rent." 2 ' The meaning of this, however, will
not become clear until a body of civil court and appellate term
cases builds up.
Certainly, the precedential value of Lipkis II and Mandel has been
diminished, and courts may ignore the obstacles in the MDL and
the New York City Administrative Code to a landlord's efforts to
collect rent when he has not obtained a certificate of occupancy
and/or registration statement.
The effect the new article 7-C3 25 will have on the case law is not
yet clear. One panel of appellate term justices held, in Mordant
320. Id. at 184, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (Sandier, J., dissenting in part).
321. N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1982, at 11, col. I (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
322. Id.
323. Id.; cf. Trans World Maintenance Serv., Inc. v. Rodd, 113 Misc. 2d 201,
205, 448 N.Y.S.2d 977, 980 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (ejectment action dismissed
"without prejudice to landlord instituting such proceeding as it deems advisable
to recover rent" on "authorization" provided in Corris for "more 'flexible
approach' "). Judge Lane in Eli Haddad took into account the following factors
in granting possession: only 4 out of the 24 units were residential; the building
was in a manufacturing zoning district; the tenants had only a "modest investment"
in the loft dwelling unit; and the landlord "tolerated with knowledge but did not
encourage or promote" residential conversion. Eli Haddad Corp. v. Coco, N.Y.L.J.,
July 14, 1982, at II, col. I.
324. 85 A.D.2d at 178, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 482; accord Mordant Assoc. v. Duval,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1982, at 6, col. I (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1982) (citing
Corris for the proposition that "[tienants residing in converted lofts, like all tenants
generally, are entitled to essential services, with the proviso that they fulfill their
reciprocal obligation to pay rent").
325. See infra notes 383-420 and accompanying text.
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Assocs. v. Duval,3 26 that "[n]ow that a regulatory scheme is in place
singularly addressed to the phenomenon of converted lofts, it should

be followed in adjudicating the rights and obligations of landlords
and tenants. ' 3 27 Another panel of appellate term justices, however,
deciding a case in which chapter 88932 applied, entertained the notion
that the doctrine of de facto rent stabilization might simultaneously
apply as well. 29
IV.
A.

Residential Status Legislation

Chapter 889

The statutory predecessor of article 7-C, which passed the New
York state legislature on June 21, 1982, was chapter 889, section
six. 33° This statute expired on June 30, 1981.331 Section six of chapter
889 codified the case law in broad terms. It applied to a unit in
a multiple dwelling formerly used for nonresidential purposes when
the owner "knew or had reason to know at the inception of the
tenancy" that the unit would now be used for residential purposes,
or when the landlord accepted rent from the residential tenant for

a period of three consecutive months. 332 If a section six tenant's
326. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1982, at 6, col. I (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1982).
327. Id.
328. See infra notes 330-37 and accompanying text.
329. Mayeri Corp. v. Starr, N.Y.L.J., June 1, 1981, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 1st Dep't 1981). The argument that the Mandel doctrine remains applicable
even where article 7-C would seem explicitly to apply is in fact being made in the
courts. Alan Liebman, Esq., Remarks at the Forum of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York on "Lofts Revisited: Were the Equities Balanced?" (Feb.
7, 1983).
330. 1980 N.Y. Laws 889, § 6.
331. See generally STATE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, HOUSING-CONVERSION OF
RECYCLED BUILDINGS IN NEW YORK CITY 2. This is a relatively uninformative
memorandum written to explain Chapter 889. Some unsystematic attempts had been
made earlier in the New York City Council to deal with the problems of illegal
lofts. E.g., The Council of the City of New York, Int. No. 618 (Apr. 10, 1979)
(landlord of a building with loft living unit had to apply for residential certificate
of occupancy; once certificate was obtained, lease was "deemed by operation of
law" to be residential and tenant received all residential tenant legal rights, including
warranty of habitability).
332. 1980 N.Y. Laws 889, § 6(a). This provision seems to have been written
with the approach of Gordon & Gordon v. Madavin, Ltd., 108 Misc. 2d 349, 441
N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1981), in mind, see supra notes 25257 and accompanying text, going beyond even the knowledge and encouragement
standard of Lipkis v. Pikus, 99 Misc. 2d 518, 416 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 1st Dep't), aff'd, 72 A.D.2d 697, 421 N.Y.S.2d 825 (lst Dep't 1979), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 874, 414 N.E.2d 399, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1980). See supra notes
228-40 and accompanying text. The disjunctive second condition for applying section
6 is even more far-reaching than the first condition: the landlord has only to have
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lease expired at any time after June 11, 1980 and before June 13,
1981,111 the tenant was entitled to a new lease of at least a year's
34
duration at a rental increase of no more than eleven percent.1
Finally, section six provided that: "[i]t shall not be a ground for
an action or proceeding to recover possession of a dwelling unit,
covered by this section, that the occupancy . . . is illegal or in
violation of provisions of the tenant's lease . . . because a residential
certificate of occupancy ... has not been issued for the building
''335

Chapter 889 imposed a moratorium on tenant evictions and a
limit on rent increases, both on terms favorable to the tenant. Such
a simple statute made the task of the courts easier.33 6 Chapter 889,
"accepted rent" from a tenant occupying "such unit for residential purposes for
any period of three successive months." 1980 N.Y. Laws 889, § 6(a)(ii). The theory
behind section 6(a)(ii) might well have been that knowledge could be imputed to
a landlord after three months of accepting rent.
333. 1980 N.Y. Laws 889, §§ 8, 9.
334. Id. § 6(b).
335. Id. § 6(c). Once again section 6 codified a trend in the case law making
an implicit distinction between holdover and nonpayment proceedings. See generally
supra notes 189, 224, & 229 and accompanying text. The courts had been willing
to allow the landlord to enforce actions for rent against the tenant but not to
evict him physically for illegal occupancy. Id.
336. Several cases concerning chapter 889 were decided by the courts. Symons
v. Nickson, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1982, at 11, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't
1982) (1980 Act applied in ejectment proceeding); Dovman v. Yahashi, 109 Misc.
2d 484, 442 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1981) (chapter 889 constitutional); Trans World Maintenance Serv., Inc. v. Rodd, 113 Misc. 2d 201, 448
N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (landlord must offer new lease to loft
resident whose lease expired between June 11, 1980 and June 30, 1981).
The most important case arising under chapter 889 was Callis v. Fifth Ave.
Corp., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 25, 1981, at 11, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981),
modified, 91 A.D.2d 565, 457 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1st Dep't 1982). In this case the tenants
made a motion for an injunction restraining the landlord from evicting the tenants. Id.
The motion was denied because the court found that the tenants were not likely
to succeed in claiming the protection of chapter 889. Id. The court insisted on
reading the Act in "conjunction" with article 7-B, and found that the Act "principally concern[ed] itself" with the article. Id. How the court arrived at this statutory
construction is not clear.
Perhaps the court looked to the title of chapter 889: "An act to amend the
multiple dwelling law .

. . ."

1980 N.Y. Laws 889. Part of chapter 889 concerned

itself with minor amendments to article 7-B. If this was the court's reasoning, it
overlooked that the title covered amendments to both the MDL and the Real
Property Law before adding "and to provide for continued occupancy by certain
residential loft tenants in such cities." Id. Chapter 889 was meant to accomplish
three purposes; the court's reasoning would have been more defensible if the phrase
"and to provide for" were linked directly to the first phrase about the MDL and
if "and" were changed to "including."
The tenants were found not to be certified artists, and since their motion for
an injunction had been based on the claim that chapter 889 protected artists, it
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however, was not a final statutory solution to the illegal loft problem
because it was merely a moratorium and provided no mechanism
by which illegal loft residences might be brought into compliance

with the law. In addition, it was not extended in the spring and
summer of 1980.1 31
B.

Predecessor Bills to Article 7-C

The state legislature did not agree, until June 21, 1982, on a bill
that would bring many loft tenants out of their legal limbo and

make them residents protected by rent stabilization whether or not
they had signed commercial leases, and that would encourage landlords to bring their buildings into compliance with the MDL and

the New York City Building Code.338

was dismissed. Callis v. Fifth Ave. Corp., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 25, 1981 at 11, col. 4
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981), modified, 91 A.D.2d 565, 457 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1st Dep't
1982). The court did hold, however, that if the tenants' "bona fide" claim was to the
protection of chapter 889 on the basis of "general residential" use, their claim
would have been permitted by article 7-B. Id.; accord Pilgreen v. 91 Fifth Ave.
Corp., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2, 1981, at 7, col. I (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981), modified,
91 A.D.2d 565, 457 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1st Dep't 1982) (related case with same landlord
and same justice but different tenant). The tenants argued, in the alternative, that
they were protected by article 7-B in their "general residential" use, but the court
found that this was not a "bona fide" claim. N.Y.L.J., Nov. 25, 1981, at 11, col. 3.
Callis was explicitly criticized in Trans World Maintenance Serv., Inc. v. Rodd,
113 Misc. 2d 201, 204, 448 N.Y.S.2d 977, 979 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982). The
Trans World court held that chapter 889 was not to be read in conjunction with
article 7-B. Id. at 204, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 979. Further, even if the tenants alleged
that they were using the premises for "joint living-work quarters," they did not
have to prove that they were artists as defined in section 276 of the MDL. Id. at
204-05, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 980. "The language of the statute is clear and there is
nothing in its legislative history... that indicates any intent to limits its applicability
as was done in Callis v. Fifth Ave. Corp." Id. at 204, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 979-80.
337. One reason for the failure to extend the Act may have been that New York
City promised a comprehensive bill in January and did not introduce it until June;
even then, the bill did not have support from most interested parties. New York
State Tenant & Neighborhood Coalition, the 1981 Legislative Session: Tenant
Protection Laws 25 (n.d.) [hereinafter cited as NYSTNC].
Another possible reason for the failure is the resistance many legislators felt to
the protection being offered to tenants of buildings with fewer than six units. Id.
at 26. Many legislators feared that the provision of such strong statutory protection
for fewer than six tenants might be a precedent for a general extension of the
Rent Stabilization Law to cover buildings housing fewer than six tenants as well.
Id.
A one-year extension of chapter 889 passed the Assembly, but never made it
out of the Senate Committee. Id. A final effort in the October session to have
the bill discharged from the Senate Committee to the floor of the Senate was
defeated. Id. at 27.

338. N.Y.

MULT. DWELL. LAW

§§ 280-87 (McKinney Supp. 1982).

19861

ILLEGAL LOFTS

The New York City Department of Housing Preservation and
Development (HPD) was given the responsibility of drafting a law
to resolve the problems of illegal loft residents, 339 and by May 1981,
it had drafted a bill which was introduced in the state assembly
that June. 314 When this bill did not pass, HPD completed, by
December, 1981, a revised version. 34' HPD's conscious policy in
developing the bills was to incorporate and build "on the precedents
already established in decisional law. ' 342 HPD's bills gave residential
status to all buildings that the courts had brought under the de
facto multiple dwelling doctrine 43 i.e., buildings with three or more
dwelling units. The proposals also brought these buildings under
rent stabilization, thereby extending the case law that had limited
3
rent stabilization to buildings with six or more units. 4
The initial bill, A.8830, praised loft conversions in its Legislative
Findings as having a "salutory effect" on neighborhoods and on
the city's economy, provided such conversions were "properly regulated. 3 45 This general pro-conversion policy translated into a protenant orientation. The bill turned on a definition of an "interim
339. Bailinson, supra note 28, at 132. A comprehensive bill regulating loft
conversions had been introduced in the state legislature as early as 1978. The
Council of the City of New York, Res. No. 235 (May 1, 1978) (this proposed
resolution was very critical of the state legislation, noting that the proposed legislation
would have encouraged illegal conversions by applying only to buildings applying
for J-51 tax abatements).
340. A. 8830, 1981-82 Sess. (June 8, 1981). The original bill HPD proposed on
May 29, 1981 was identical to the bill that was introduced except for some changes
in lettering and numbering. A. 8830 was introduced by the Committee on Rules
without any legislative sponsors because no group supported it. NYSTNC, supra
note 337, at 25.
341. New York City Dept. of Housing Preservation and Development, An Act
to Amend the Multiple Dwelling Law (Dec. 16, 1981) [hereinafter cited as the Dec.
16, 1981 Bill). This bill was a slightly rewritten version of a proposed bill submitted
by HPD on December 9, 1981.
342. NEW YoRK CITY DEPT. OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
RESIDENTIAL STATUS OF ILLEGAL LOFT CONVERSIONS I (September 1980) [hereinafter
cited as ILLEGAL LOFT CONVERSIONS). Not all city agencies have been as favorably
disposed toward the doctrines the courts have created as has HPD. The Legislative
Representative of the City of New York, Office of the Mayor, wrote that "[t]his
residential status bill is vital to the zoning enforcement interests of New York City.
The Mayor's Office of Loft Enforcement is now attempting to prevent new illegal
conversions of loft space. This process may become more difficult if the courts
continue to thwart attempts by the City to maintain the integrity of its zoning
resolution by making rulings contrary to the intent of the City as reflected in local
zoning." M. Boepple, Memorandum in Support 7 (Dec. 21, 1981) (written in
support of the Dec. 16, 1981 Bill).
343. See supra notes 164-240 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 274-304 and accompanying text.
345. A. 8830, 1981-82 Sess. (June 8, 1981), § 2 (§ 280).
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multiple dwelling." 3 4 In the districts where the Zoning Resolution
did not permit residence as of right, i.e., in manufacturing zones
in New York City,3 47 interim multiple dwelling status would not have
been granted.148 In other districts, residence in an interim multiple
349
dwelling would have been permitted regardless of any other statutes.
The owner of a building to which the bill applied was obligated
to take the measures necessary to obtain a certificate of occupancy
as a class A multiple dwelling, 350 but had a limited option to restore
a building to commercial or manufacturing uses if there were fewer
than six residential units. 35' The tenant of an interim multiple dwelling
was shielded from any "action or proceeding to recover possession"
of a unit based on the claim that the occupancy was "illegal or in
violation of provisions of the tenant's lease" if the illegality arose
from the lack of a certificate of occupancy or the presence of a
restriction on use in the lease. 35 2 Once an owner had obtained a
certificate of occupancy, the unit was brought under the Rent Stabilization Law by an amendment to the Emergency Tenant Protection
Act 313 and the initial legal regulated rent was calculated. 35 4 The only

346. Id. § 2 (§ 281).
347. See supra note 66.
348. A. 8830, 1981-82 Sess. (June 8, 1981), § 2 (§ 281). Here the HPD proposal
was less favorable to tenants than the courts have been, because the courts have
never explicitly considered the impact that zoning might have on declaring a building
a de facto multiple dwelling.
349. Id. § 2 (§ 283).
350. Id. § 2 (§ 284). The owner must also follow a series of timed steps before
obtaining the certificate. Id. If the owner does reconvert, he must pay the tenant
the "fair market value of any improvements made by such tenant, and reasonable
moving costs." Id. (cross referencing to § 2 (§ 284.1(d)).
351. Id. § 2 (§ 285.4).
352. Id. § 2 (§ 286.1(a)).
353. Id. § 5.
354. Id. § 6.e.(l),(2). The rent was based on the July 1, 1979 rent plus a legally
stipulated percentage increase in accordance with the age of the current lease. For
example, if the latest lease had been signed on or after July 1, 1978, the lease
rental would have been increased 11%0; if it had been signed on or after July 1,
1970 and before July 1, 1971, the increase would have been 52%. HPD may have
been trying to adjust for the twin facts that most loft leases are for more than
one or two years and that rents under a lease would have been much lower than
the market value in 1981 if the lease had been signed early in the 1970's. See
supra notes 56-58, & 157 and accompanying text. But ILLEGAL LOFT CONVERSIONS,
supra note 342, at 6-7, mentions only a concern with the equitable distribution of
the legalization costs between landlord and tenant, a motivation which one commentator identifies as HPD's only motive. Bailinson, supra note 28, at 136.
One organization of building owners summarized A. 8830's potential impact on
rents, and persuasively showed that landlords would not have received anywhere
near market rentals after the statutory rent adjustment. REBNY RESPONSE, supra

1986]

ILLEGAL LOFTS

allowable rent increase, over the initial legal rent, was $2000 per
unit annually for the costs of bringing the building into compliance
with the MDL and the Building Code.355 The tenant would receive
a rent abatement for all fixtures for which he had paid and that
complied with the applicable laws and codes.35 6 Finally, the bill
contained a provision under which a landlord could have applied
to a locally designated "judicial or quasi-judicial body" to attempt
to show that obtaining a residential certificate of occupancy would
cost more than "the market value of the building as if vacant after
such certificate was obtained;" and if this finding were made, the
owner could reconvert the building to manufacturing or commercial
37
uses.
The most pro-tenant features35 of HPD's initial proposal were
the provision for a minimal rent adjustment upon legalization359 and
the extension of rent stabilization, which had applied only to nonloft buildings with six or more dwelling units, to converted buildings
with as few as three units.60 The December 16, 1981 revised HPD
note 89, at 8. The REBNY estimated that the HPD formula in section 6(e) of A.
8830 would have led to a range of residential rents of $2 to $3.80 per square foot,
without considering the rent reductions for which tenants would be eligible under
section 6.e.(3)(a). Id. REBNY contrasted this range of rents to contemporary
commercial rents for similar spaces ($3.25 to $4.00 per square foot) and contemporary legal residential loft rentals ($4.00 per square foot and up). Id. It summarized
its objections by writing that "[t]he proposal would therefore create a class of
statutory tenants with rents far below market level and place them in a system of
rent regulation which would assure continued depressed rentals in these spaces."
Id.

355. A. 8830, 1981-82 Sess. (June 8, 1981), § 6.e.(2)(b).
356. Id. § 6.e.(3)(a).
357. Id. § 2 (§285.2). If the owner does reconvert, he must pay the tenant's
"reasonable moving costs" and the "fair market value" of any improvements. Id.
(cross referencing to § 2 (§284(d))).
358. Bailinson writes that:
Privately, HPD and other city officials admit that the burden [of legalization costs) is being placed most heavily on the landlords. They feel
that the property owners have enjoyed substantial profits from residential
tenants to whom they have not had to supply residential services. Some
of these profits from past years will have to go to pay legalization costs.
Bailinson, supra note 28, at 136. Bailinson's study was based heavily on interviews.
359. How much it will cost to bring a unit up to statutory standards has been

the subject of continuing debate. Estimates range from $10,000-$15,000 per unit
(New York City) to $25,000-$30,000 (Real Estate Board of New York). Id. at 137.
Bailinson criticizes A. 8830 for being an inflexible approach because each building
will have its own unique problems in meeting the MDL and Building Code standards,
as these are conversions and not newly erected buildings. Id. at 138. Any set
formula for rent increases, therefore, is inappropriate in Bailinson's view. Id.
360. The REBNY objected strenuously to this as creating an "entirely new class
of regulated residential buildings." REBNY RESPONSE, supra note 89, at 7. HPD
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bill ("December 16, 1981 Bill") 3 6' provided a number of concessions
to landlords:3 62 (1) it gave them more time to obtain a residential
certificate of occupancy; (2) it relaxed the proposed standards that
had to be met in reconverting the building to commercial and
manufacturing uses; and (3) it created more generous terms upon
which the landlord could recover legalization costs. 3 63 The December
16, 1981 Bill simultaneously retained the most important tenant
protection-interim multiple dwellings were covered under the Emer3
gency Tenant Protection Act and the Rent Stabilization Law. 1
The difference in approach is clear after reviewing the Legislative
Findings sections of the May and December versions of the bill.
Where the initial bill gave qualified support to conversions as a
positive good,3 6 the December 16, 1981 Bill had no such language.36 6
The initial bill was intended to prevent "the exaction of unjust,
unreasonable and oppressive rents and to forestall profiteering, [sic]
speculation," 36 7 while the December 16, 1981 Bill intended to establish
"a system whereby residential rentals can be reasonably adjusted so
that residential tenants can assist in paying the cost of such legalization without being forced to relocate.'"' 6
With all the extensions possible under the initial bill, the owner
had to obtain a residential certificate of occupancy within two years,
3 69
which could be extended to three years for "good cause shown."
itself acknowledged that one of the reasons A. 8830 did not pass was "fear" on
the part of state legislators that the extension of rent stabilization to loft buildings
with fewer than six tenants might be "a precedent for a general extension of rent
regulation to all such housing." LOFT HOUSING, supra note 297, at 5; cf. supra
note 337 (similar fears raised regarding chapter 889).
361. Dec. 16, 1981 Bill, supra note 341.
362. See generally A. 8074, 1981-82 Sess. (Mar. 31, 1981), for an instructive
contrast to the provisions of the HPD bill as it had evolved. A. 8074 was a bill
introduced by three assemblymen, of whom Paul Viggiano of Manhattan was the
most active. A. 8074 did not restrict "interim multiple dwelling" to buildings which
met local zoning resolutions, id. § 3 (§ 282), and contained no provision similar
to section 2 (§ 285.4), supra note 351, which allows the owner in limited circumstances
to reconvert the building to commercial or manufacturing uses. In one significant
way, however, A. 8074 was much more fair to landlords than was A. 8830: it
allowed a landlord to apply for a rent increase of 5% to be paid each year for
ten years to cover 50% of the costs of obtaining a residential certificate of occupancy.
A. 8074 § 10(e.(2)(b). HPD adopted this type of approach in its December, 1981
proposed bill. See infra note 373 and accompanying text.
363. See infra notes 370-73 and accompanying text.
364. Dec. 16, 1981 Bill, supra note 341, § 1 (§§ 286.3, 286.13).
365. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
366. Dec. 16, 1981 Bill, supra note 341, § I (§ 280).
367. A. 8830, 1981-82 Sess. (June 8, 1981), § 2 (§ 280).
368. Dec. 16, 1981 Bill, supra note 341, § I (§ 280).
369. A. 8830, 1981-82 Sess. (June 8, 1981), § 2 (§ 284.1(a)).
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The December 16, 1981 Bill, however, granted the owner up to three
years, which could be extended to five years for "good cause
shown." 370 The December 16, 1981 Bill allowed the owner to apply
for exemption from the Bill and to reconvert the building to nonresidential uses if residential use would have an "unreasonably adverse impact on a non-residential conforming use tenant within the
building" or if the "cost of compliance render[ed] legal residential
conversion infeasible." '3 7' The initial bill allowed reconversion only
when legalization would cost more than the market value of the
3 72
building after a residential certificate of occupancy was obtained.
Under the December 16, 1981 Bill, the landlord could apply for
rent adjustments to recover the full costs, including financing, or

obtaining a residential certificate of occupancy.3 73 This provided a
more generous rental to the owner than the initial bill which limited
3 74
rent increases for legalization to $2000 per year.

The most important pro-tenant change in the December 16, 1981
Bill was a new provision that allowed the fixtures in a unit to be

370. Dec. 16, 1981 Bill, supra note 341, § 1 (284.1(i)). HPD explained this
change by the need "to accommodate owners with limited resources and in consideration of today's very difficult borrowing situation." Lor HousING, supra note
297, at 10.
371. Dec. 16, 1981 Bill, supra note 341, § 1 (285.2). The test of "cost infeasibility"
is also more pro-landlord than the test prescribed in A. 8830. The test in the
December 16, 1981 bill is a "reasonable return on the owner's investment." Id.
If the owner does reconvert, he must "file an irrevocable recorded covenant ...
that the building will not be re-converted to residential [use]" for fifteen years.
Id. This requirement is meant to prevent a landlord from first reconverting to rid
a building of its old residential tenants and then either re-renting or selling the
space at higher current market rates to new residential tenants, or selling the
building to a new owner for such purposes. LOFT HOUSING, supra note 297, at
11.
372. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
373. Dec. 16, 1981 Bill, supra note 341, § 1 (286.5).
374. See supra note 355 and accompanying text. HPD noted that "[tihe major
capital improvements approach, notwithstanding its complications, appears to be
one that is perceived as fairer than a blanket approach by both owners and tenants."
Lor HoUsING, supra note 297, at 8. The original HPD proposal did not include
the idea of "an individual building-by-building pass-through of costs" because of
the fear of excessive paperwork. Id. at 7.
Another advantage to such an approach is that to the extent the tenant has done
the work required for a certificate of occupancy, or can agree with his landlord
to do the work, the landlord will not be entitled to an adjustment in rent. Dec.
16, 1981 Bill, supra note 341, § I (§ 286.6). The owner has a right of first refusal.
If the owner buys the improvements, he may remove the unit from the provisions
of the bill requiring rent regulation, provided there were fewer than six residential
units in the building when the Bill became effective. Dec. 16, 1981 Bill, supra note
341, § 1 (§ 286.6).
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sold, with a once per unit limitation, to an incoming tenant by the
tenant who made or purchased the improvements.37 5 Tenants thus

were to be provided with an opportunity to recover their often
substantial investments without having to bargain with building owners.37 6 Moreover, if the number of dwelling units dropped below
three, the protections of the December 16, 1981 Bill continued for
the other residents.377 In a major addendum, the December 16, 1981

Bill would have created a "special loft unit," the "loft board," to
administer the Bill and to resolve disputes between owners and

tenants .37
Both of HPD's proposed bills suffered from one fundamental
flaw: their protection was limited to buildings in which at least three
3 79 Of
units were occupied as residences on a specified cutoff date.
course, there may be many tenants living in illegal loft buildings
with less than three units.180 In addition, since New York City
envisions its seven-point program38s as restraining future illegal conversions, it is of the opinion that there is no need to deal legislatively

with illegal conversions occurring after a specified date. The reasoning
is, at best, of dubious validity, as illegal conversions may well

continue on a large scale. 8 2 These two problems have been carried
over into the bill that was eventually enacted.
C.

Article 7-C
The December 16, 1981 Bill was introduced in the 1982 state

375. Dec. 16, 1981 Bill, supra note 341, § 1 (§ 286.6).
376.

The resolution of the fixture issue is one of the most difficult issues
within a comprehensive loft package. Both owners and tenants have very
strong feelings with regard to the issue. The tenants have often invested
substantial amounts of time and money in improving the raw space which
they initially leased. There may, however, be little correlation between
the cost of residential amenities and the cost of legalization.
LOFT HoUsING, supra note 297, at 8. Without such a provision, a tenant could
have ended up paying an increased rent under the Dec. 16, 1981 Bill and losing
his or her investment upon moving.
377. Dec. 16, 1981 Bill, supra note 341, § I (§ 281.3). Once again the legislation
has codified a judicial holding. See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
378. Dec. 16, 1981 Bill, supra note 341, § I (§ 282).
379. The cutoff date was the effective date of the bill in A. 8830, and April
I, 1980 in the December 16, 1981 Bill. A. 8830, 1981-82 Sess. (June 8, 1981),
§ 2 (0 281.3); Dec. 16, 1981 Bill, supra note 341, § 1 (§ 281.1(iii), .3).
380. Cf supra notes 30, 31 (smaller loft buildings more likely to be converted
than large loft buildings).
381. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
382. See infra note 427.
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legislature session383 and, without significant amendment, was approved on June 21, 1982, effective immediately.3M This Bill, as had
the previous bills, created a new article 7-C of the Multiple Dwelling
Law.
1. Coverage
Article 7-C covers those buildings defined as "interim multiple
dwellings." 3 5 An "interim multiple dwelling" is a New York City
building "which (i) at any time was occupied for manufacturing,
commercial, or warehouse purposes;" (ii) lacks a multiple dwelling
certificate of occupancy; and (iii) as of December 1, 1981 had been
"occupied for residential purposes" since April 1, 1980 by "any
three or more families living independently of one another.''386 A
building cannot be an interim multiple dwelling in any geographical
area where the Zoning Resolution does not permit conversion as of
right, with the important exception of buildings in areas designated
by the Zoning Resolution3"7 as study areas for "possible rezoning
to permit residential use.''388 The legalization requirements of article
7-C,38 9 however, do not apply to buildings in study areas.3 9

Significantly, until the owner obtains a residential certificate of
occupancy, non-residential space in an interim multiple dwelling may
not be converted to residential use and the provisions of article 7C do not apply to such space.3 9' Finally, a reduction below three
in the number of residential units in an interim multiple dwelling
after December 1, 1981 does not "eliminate the protections of this
article for any remaining residential occupants qualified for such
protections.' '392
383.
384.
385.
386.

Artworkers News, Feb. 1982, at 45, col. 1.
1982 N.Y. Laws 349, § 3. This bill was immediately effective. Id.
See 1982 N.Y. Laws 349.
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 281.1 (McKinney Supp. 1986).

387. Currently, these areas consist of manufacturing districts in Brooklyn Community Boards 1, 2, 6 and 7; manufacturing districts in Queens Community Boards
1,2 and 3; and all manufacturing districts in Manhattan between 17th and 59th
Streets, and Ninth and Twelfth Avenues.

LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, CITY OF
NEW YORK, LOFTS-LEGALIZATION OF INTERIM MULTIPLE DWELLINGS, reprinted in

1982 N.Y. Laws 349, § 281.2 [hereinafter cited as 1982 City Memorandum].
388. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 281.2 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
389. See infra notes 410-15 and accompanying text.
390. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 281.2 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
391. Id. § 281.3. If it is enforced, this provision may severely restrict future

conversions.
392. Id. There is a nice ambiguity here. What exactly are "protections" for a
tenant? They probably embrace the legalization requirements of section 281.1, which
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2. Tenant Protections
Under article 7-C, a landlord cannot evict a tenant because either
the building lacks a residential certificate of occupancy, a93 or the

lease is allegedly violated because of the lack of a certificate of
occupancy. Rents are governed by the existing lease and, when it
expires, by guidelines set by the Loft Board.39 Once the building

is in compliance with article 7-B, tenants will come under rent
stabilization.

95

3. Owner Protections
Although a landlord's right to evict a tenant for illegal occupancy
is restricted, the landlord may now bring an action for possession
due to nonpayment even if he does not have the certificate of
occupancy required by sections 302 and 325 of the MDL. 39 The
owner also may apply to the Loft Board 97 for an exemption from

article 7-C if "obtaining a legal residential certificate of occupancy
would cause an unjustifiable hardship"

because of either (1) an

"unreasonably adverse impact on a non-residential conforming use

tenant" in the building or (2) a cost of compliance which "renders
legal residential conversion infeasible.' '98 The test for "unreasonably

adverse impact" is whether "residential conversion would necessitate
displacement" 3 99 of the non-residential tenant while "infeasibility"
will protect the tenant against living in a dwelling that does not meet the Building
Code or MDL standards. See id. § 280 (legislative findings speaking of these
dangers). But a court could construe "protections" to cover only section 286(1),
which permits occupancy in interim multiple dwellings even if there is no residential
certificate of occupancy. After all, the argument would go, the state legislature
cannot have meant that a landlord should have to go to the expense of meeting
even the relatively flexible standards of article 7-B for a single residential tenant.
393. Id. § 286.1.
394. Id. § 286.2.
395. Id. § 286.3.
396. Id. § 285.1. Although the state legislature must have intended that such
actions be allowed in all circumstances, by not explicitly providing that local laws
and rules such as sections 2900.21 of the Civil Court of the City of N.Y. Rules
of Practice (superseded and recodified at McKinney 1986 New York Rules of Court
§ 208.42(g) (22 NYCRR § 208.42)) and D26-41.21 of the N.Y. City Administrative
Code are preempted by article 7-C, tenants still could attempt to use those sections
to thwart an action for possession for nonpayment. See supra notes 169-71 & 190
and accompanying text.
397. See infra notes 417-20 and accompanying text.
398. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW

§ 285.2 (McKinney Supp. 1986).

399. Id. § 285.2(d). There obviously are many specific fact situations that the
Loft Board will have to deal with under this provision. Any imaginative landlord
who wants to get rid of his tenants will be able to create a residential conversion
plan which would require displacing a nonresidential tenant.
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is measured by a "reasonable return on the owner's investment not
maximum return on investment." 400
To prevent owners from abusing this exemption by evicting present
tenants who are paying lower than market rents and rerenting at
market rents, the landlord must give an "irrevocable recorded covenant" that once the building has been returned to nonresidential
uses it will not be reconverted to residential use for fifteen years.4'
All exemptions also must be applied for within nine months of the
establishment of the Loft Board,4 which will further limit the ability
of landlords to harass tenants. Finally, if the Loft Board approves
an exemption, it "may fix reasonable terms and conditions for the
vacating of residential occupancy." 43
"°

4. Fixtures 40
Under article 7-C a residential tenant may sell to an incoming
tenant "any improvements" he has made to the unit or purchased
from a former tenant. 4 5 The improvements may only be sold once
per unit.4 The landlord must be given a right of first refusal for
the improvements at the "fair market value."' 407 Upon purchase of
the improvements by the landlord, any unit in a building with fewer
than six residential units that is under rent regulation solely because
of article 7-C and that is not receiving J-51 tax benefits is exempted
from article 7-C rent regulation.4 In a building with six or more
residential units, the unit with purchased improvements may be rented
at the then market rate but subsequently is subject to rent regulation.0
5. Legalization
In order to receive the protection of article 7-C, the landlord must
bring an interim multiple dwelling unit into compliance with article
400. Id. § 285.2(c).
401. Id. § 285.2.
402. Id. The Loft Board had been in existence for almost four months by the
end of January 1983. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1983, § 8, at 1,col. 2.
403. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 285.2 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
404. Id. § 286.6.

405.
406.
407.
408.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

409. Id. Presumably, these different treatments are given to units in loft buildings

with different numbers of units since a major goal of article 7-C is to protect
tenants' investment in loft conversions, and not to provide a permanent new category
of rent-stabilization units. See supra note 360.
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7-B of the MDL 410 by December 21, 1984.411 By June 21, 1985, a
residential certificate of occupancy must be obtained, although the
Loft Board may extend the June 21, 1985 deadline by two years if
the building is in compliance with article 7-B and "good cause"
for the extension is shown. 4 2 The landlord is required to pay the
initial cost of compliance with article 7-B and to obtain a residential
certificate of occupancy, 413 but he may obtain a rent adjustment to
cover the "reasonable" cost of obtaining such a certificate. 4 4 This
"reasonable" cost, which includes the cost of financing the improvements, will be paid by the residential tenants over either a ten
or a fifteen year amortization period. 411
46
6. Cooperative & Condominium Conversions 1

Under article 7-C, an eviction plan cannot be filed until a residential
certificate of occupancy is filed and all residential tenants are offered
one, two or three year leases. In a non-eviction plan, the sponsor
must remain responsible for all work necessary to obtain a certificate
of occupancy. Moreover, the same statutory protections available to
rent stabilized tenants in general are made applicable to tenants in
interim multiple dwellings. These changes provide loft tenants with
the assurance that legal conversions will not be used as a means of
circumventing the tenant protections built into article 7-C.

410. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 284.1(i)(C) (McKinney Supp. 1986). Absent this
provision, many of the tenant's improvements could be held to be fixtures, and
thus removable only with the landlord's permission. See RASCH, supra note 165,
§ 508. In addition, the commercial leases signed by many loft tenants provide that
all fixtures and alterations become the landlord's property. See, e.g., REAL ESTATE
BOARD OF NEW YORK, INC., STANDARD FORM OF LOFT LEASE § 3 (1973); see also
RASCH, supra note 165, § 514 ("It is entirely competent for a landlord and a
tenant to contract that any and all property placed upon or attached to the demised
premises shall belong to the landlord upon termination of the lease.").

411. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1983, § 8 at 1, at col. 3. Under section 284.1 of
article 7-C, there are two other interim deadlines: (1) the owner must have filed
an alteration permit by March 21, 1983, and (2) the owner must have taken all
"reasonable and necessary action" to get an approved alteration permit by June
21, 1983. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1983, § 8, at 1, col. 3 (dates-derived from

statutory provisions, given above).
412. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 284.1.
413. Id. § 286.5.
414. Id.
415. Id. The ten-year period applies if interest and service charges are not
amortized by the tenants, the fifteen-year applies if they are amortized. Id.
416. Id. § 286.9.

19861

ILLEGAL LOFTS

7. Loft Board41 7
Article 7-C provides that the mayor is to appoint a four- to ninemember Loft Board consisting of representatives of "the public, the
real estate industry, loft residential tenants, and loft manufacturing
interests, and a chairperson. ' 418 The Loft Board is to make determinations on interim multiple dwelling status, landlord hardship
applications, rent adjustments and guidelines, housing maintenance
standards during legalization, and fair market value of tenant-made
improvements and moving costs. 419 The Loft Board shall promulgate
420
rules and regulations to carry out these duties.
8. Problems with Article 7-C
The most problematic aspect of article 7-C is that, because of
the date of conversion, geographical location, and other factors,
several types of residential loft tenants are not covered. These tenants
include legal Artists-in-Residence, tenants in buildings for which a
residential certificate of occupancy was obtained before the enactment
of article 7-C, residential tenants who moved into units converted
after April 1981, tenants in loft buildings with fewer than three
residential units, non-artists and uncertified artists in SoHo and
NoHo, tenants in city-owned buildings and, in the new mixed-use
zoning districts in buildings that did not meet the requirements for
preservation of commercial space, 42' those tenants who did not apply
to be "grandfathered. ' ' 422 No one has any idea how many tenants
are included in these categories. Without article 7-C, some of these

417. Id. § 282.
418. Id. The Mayor has appointed four public members, a chairman, and one
member each for tenants, landlords, and industry. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1983,
§ 8, at 1 & 14, cols. 2 & 3.
419. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 282.
420. Id.
421. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 15-215 (1983).
422. See generally Artworkers News, Feb. 1982, at 45, col. I. The legislative
representative of New York City, in writing in support of article 7-C, stated that
"[tihe bill when enacted will take a 'snap shot' of those people eligible for protection

under this article. The bill is directed at protecting those loft pioneers of the arts
community that have played such an important role in the development of loft
areas." 1982 City Memorandum, supra note 387, at A-284. The legislative representative ignores the thousands of non-artists which article 7-C will protect. See
supra note 387 and accompanying text. The legislative representative's statement
will not encourage the courts to read the particular provisions or general legislative
intent of article 7-C expansively.
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tenants, such as Artists-in-Residence, are not illegal, but all of them
lack the substantial tenant protections provided by article 7-C.423
If article 7-C is enforced, it together with the April 1981 zoning
amendments will forever prevent the loft market from meeting the
demand for relatively inexpensive housing and will relegate it to
meeting only the needs of Manhattan's gentry. The Loft Board has
already approved substantial rent increases, even before landlords
have brought their buildings into compliance with article 7-B. 24 The
costs of compliance with article 7-B are substantial. Rents in loft
living units, therefore, can be expected to continue climbing steeply,
pricing loft living units out of the reach of any but the upper42 51
middle class and the rich.
V.

Conclusion

The economic forces that have made for illegal conversions 426 in
New York City show no signs of abatement. It is not any more
likely in the 1980's than it was in the 1970's that the New York
City government will evict thousands of illegal loft tenants. Therefore,
New York City is left with the option of trying to prevent illegal
conversions from ever occurring by strictly enforcing the zoning law
and Building Code. Such enforcement may prove futile.427
Although the problem of illegal conversion has been studied intensively by New York City since at least 1977,428 and has led to
423. See supra notes 393-95 and accompanying text.
424. For loft dwelling unit leases that expire before the unit is brought under
rent stabilization, the Loft Board on December 21, 1982, approved rent increases
from seven to thirty-three percent, depending on how long ago the last increase
was imposed. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1982, at B8, col. 1.
425. See generally supra notes 410-15 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
427. The Mayor's Office of Loft Enforcement claims to have prevented more
than 50 illegal conversions in Manhattan and two in Brooklyn in the last two years;
furthermore, it claims to know of no illegal conversions in Manhattan it has not
prevented. Carl Weisbrod, Chairman of the Loft Board, remarks at the Forum of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on "Lofts Revisited: Were
the Equities Balanced?" (Feb. 7, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Equities]. Others
take a less sanguine view of the enforcement efforts, especially in boroughs other
than Manhattan, in particular Brooklyn and Queens, where much residential conversion activity is going on. Chuck Delaney, Tenant Representative on the Loft
Board, Equities, supra (illegal conversions in Brooklyn have doubled since 1980); see
also The Phoenix, April 27, 1978, at 14, col. I (description of conversions on the
Brooklyn waterfront between Brooklyn and Manhattan bridges). It should be remembered, however, that more than 50% of New York City's industrial space is
in Manhattan. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.

428. The first major study was published in 1978.
note 28.

RESIDENTA.

RE-USE,

supra
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a flurry of legislative action, 429 these reforms do not promise to

solve the problems. The courts will continue to have a major role
to play in mediating the often conflicting interests of landlords and
30
residential tenants. For many of those who live in illegal lofts,
the courts will continue to be a forum for conflict resolution, a
forum whose rules are unclear and currently changing.
Residential conversion of industrial loft buildings is not a phenomenon unique to New York City; the troubling social and legal
issues it raises have surfaced in cities as diverse as Seattle, Berkeley,

and Boston.43' Nor is residential conversion the only widespread
flaunting in New York City of the Zoning Resolution, the MDL,
and the Building Code. There is currently a problem in the boroughs
outside Manhattan, where one- or two-family houses are being illegally converted to three-family houses.4 12 These conversions have
generated their own case law, which seems to exist in isolation from

the illegal loft cases, although there are many similarities in the
basic landlord and tenant conflicts that arise.4 33 New York City's
experience with illegal lofts does not encourage optimism about the
ability, in general, of either statutory or case law to channel such
challenges to zoning and housing laws into legal uses.
429. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 61, 62 and accompanying text.
431. Truslow, The Artist's Loft Movement: Its Impact on Urban Zoning Codes
and Economic Repercussions 27-29 (May 25, 1979) (Boston University Law School
paper); cf. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1982, § 8, at 10, col. I (discussing residential
conversion of industrial loft buildings in suburbs surrounding New York City).
432. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1983, § 8, at 16, col. 1.
433. E.g., Coulston v. Teliscope Prods., 85 Misc. 2d 339, 378 N.Y.S.2d 553
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1975); Glatzer v. Malkenson, N.Y.L.J., March 31,
1978, at 12, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1978); Corbin v. Harris, 92 Misc. 2d
480, 400 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1977); Stanley Assocs. v. Marrero,
87 Misc. 2d 1011, 386 N.Y.S.2d 953 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1976). Stanley
Associates and Coulston both rely on a theory that in a nonpayment proceeding,
the MDL does not prevent recovery of rent if a certificate of occupancy is lacking
because "[slection 302 is a penal statute in derogation of the common law and
should be strictly construed so that a landlord is not deprived of rent due for the
use and occupation of his property." Coulston, 85 Misc. 2d at 340, 378 N.Y.S.2d
at 554; accord Stanley Associates, 87 Misc. 2d at 1013, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 955. In
Corbin and Glatzer, ejectment actions succeeded in evicting tenants whose residence
was illegal, even though in both cases the building was found to be a de facto
multiple dwelling. Corbin, 92 Misc. 2d at 483-84, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 311-12; Glatzer,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 31, 1978, at 12, col. 5.

